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Abstract The Modern Synthesis explains the evolution of life at a mesolevel by 
identifying phenotype–environmental interactions as the locus of evolution and by 
identifying natural selection as the means by which evolution occurs. Both micro- 
and macroevolutionary schools of thought are post-synthetic attempts to evolution-
ize phenomena above and below organisms that have traditionally been conceived 
as non-living. Microevolutionary thought associates with the study of how genetic 
selection explains higher-order phenomena such as speciation and extinction, while 
macroevolutionary research fields understand species and higher taxa as biological 
individuals and they attribute evolutionary causation to biotic and abiotic factors 
that transcend genetic selection. The microreductionist and macroholistic research 
schools are characterized as two distinct epistemic cultures where the former favor 
mechanical explanations, while the latter favor historical explanations of the evolu-
tionary process by identifying recurring patterns and trends in the evolution of life. 
I demonstrate that both cultures endorse radically different notions on time and 
explain how both perspectives can be unified by endorsing epistemic pluralism.
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But how … shall we describe a process which nobody has seen performed, and of which 
no written history gives any account? This is only to be investigated, first, in examining 
the nature of those solid bodies, the history of which we want to know; and 2dly, in exam-
ining the natural operations of the globe, in order to see if there now actually exist such 
operations, as, from the nature of the solid bodies, appear to have been necessary to their 
formation. (Hutton, cited in Teggart 1916: 249)
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… We need a third gambit, one that admits history as a fair game to the scientific 
 enterprise – but does so without exclusive attention to the individual facts of the matter. 
One that focusses on historical pattern. (Eldredge 1999: 10)
1  Introduction
When you look up micro or macro in a dictionary, the “micro” is defined as small or 
minute and “macro” as large or long. To exemplify the meaning of the words, many 
dictionaries will give you a lineup that goes from the micro to the meso to the macro. 
The terms stem from the ancient Greek mı-krós, mésos, and makrós and are loanwords 
borrowed from more ancient Indo-European (including Indo-Iranian) languages spo-
ken by Vedic Indian and Mesopotamian peoples. Like their predecessors, Greek phi-
losophers used the concepts as prefixes to form combinatorial words whereby the 
micro–meso–macro determined either the size or the temporal and chronological 
scale of the phenomenon denoted by the noun that followed in the combination.
Stated otherwise, the micro, meso, and macro refer to verbal, geometric, and 
arithmetic measurements of matter, space, and time. We still use the micro–
meso–macro prefixes. Biochemists, for example, call DNA a macromolecule to 
indicate that it is a structure composed of smaller subunits; archaeologists divide 
the Paleolithic or Stone Age into a Lower Mesolithic and Upper Paleolithic 
period to give chronometric and spatial accounts of hominid tool technologies. 
Paleontologists use geological time to define visible eukaryotic multicellular life 
that evolved at the beginning of the Cambrian as transitioning from the Paleozoic 
or ancient life to the Mesozoic or middle life and the Cenozoic or more recent life.
The conceptualization of matter, space, and time brings us to the heart of cos-
mology, i.e., the study of the universe. Cosmologies are worldviews that function 
as epistemic systems that delineate the boundaries of the universe and everything 
in it. Over the ages, cosmologies have often been depicted in cosmographies such 
as ancient Greek Chains of Beings, Judeo-Christian Scala Naturae, or Far Eastern 
Wheels of Time that function as mappings of the world.
Aristotle, for example, distinguished between the realm of non-being (nothing), 
the physical realm of coming and becoming (the cosmos), and the metaphysical 
realm of being (roughly the aetiology or causes that underlie all order in the uni-
verse which he reified into an ultimate and final cause: the unmovable mover). The 
micro–meso–macro prefixes were exclusively used to measure the physical realm 
which these ancient peoples understood as a single cosmic whole that for the sake 
of analysis is dividable into embedded parts, i.e., the micro-, meso- and macrocos-
mos. Together, they form the great chain of being and becoming, and that chain 
of being and becoming, for Aristotle, follows metaphysical, causal laws that give 
teleological directionality to how change occurs.
Aristotle’s chain of being as well as his more ultimate distinction into 3 realms 
was synthesized into Judeo-Christian cosmologies where the micro–meso–macro 
come in the form of a lineup of distinct and hierarchically structured layers of 
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reality, respectively, made up of inanimate matter, animate (living) matter, and 
the celestial/divine. The latter ladder became reconceptualized in more scientific 
terms by Spencer (1862, 1876, 1915) who, following Hutton, distinguished a lin-
ear sequence that goes from the inorganic to the organic and superorganic. The 
micro or inorganic associates with chemistry and particle physics, the meso or 
organic with the life sciences which include the humanities as well as the earth 
sciences, and the macro or superorganic with astronomy and the planetary sci-
ences. Early historical linguists, ethnologists, and sociologists adhered to a doc-
trine we now call organicism and understood languages, cultures, and societies 
as beings or living organisms, but Spencer reconceptualized these phenomena as 
extended organs of living beings that surpass the organic and thus also form part 
of the superorganic.
In all these hierarchical lineups, the living holds the middle between on the 
one hand the dead and on the other hand what transcends the living. In religious 
terms, that what transcends the living coincides with the supernatural and is there-
fore conceptualized as distinct in matter, space, and time. In scientific terms, what 
transcends the living can associate either with geology, physics, and astronomy, 
or, on a smaller scale, with sociocultural, linguistic, and political structures which 
equally surpass the individual or the collective. In the sciences, the organic has 
a more fluent connection with some aspects of the superorganic, because living 
beings can individually and collectively alter aspects of the superorganic, either 
ecologically speaking by altering the earth’s surface and atmosphere, or in what 
regards the creation of new phenomena such as cultures and languages. However, 
the living cannot influence or alter star or planetary formations, or at least there is 
no evidence that proves we can, so eventually there is a rupture. In recent years, 
science has also made the divide between the inorganic and organic more fluent 
because we accept that living matter is made up of the same chemical compounds 
and physical particles. Life and inorganic matter both follow the same chemical 
and physical laws. Nonetheless, living matter evolves, and the evolution of life is 
considered to follow new rules which are formulated in the form of evolutionary 
mechanisms.
What is noteworthy is that none of these lineups converge with the actual his-
tory of the universe, which according to the current standard view goes from 
the Big Bang to star and planetary constellations, the evolution of life out of 
 non-living matter on at least one of these planets, and the evolution of new phe-
nomena out of life. It demonstrates that our ways to conceptualize the universe are 
outdated and biased toward more ancient cosmologies that no longer form part of 
our worldview. Huxley (1942, 1957), for example, when defining what he called 
“evolutionary humanism” tried to fix the problem and went from the cosmic to 
the biological to the psychosocial, but he was silenced by mainstream scientists, 
strangely so for being too fanatic.
Another observation drawn from investigating these scales is that life has 
always held the middle, but its exact position and beginning within a univer-
sal cosmic scale has been far from stable. Are populations, species, or higher 
taxa real? Are cultures, languages, and societal structures alive? These make up 
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fundamental questions of Western science. Biology is traditionally defined as the 
science of life and evolution as the change that life undergoes through time. But 
definitions of life are diverse. Darwin (1859) understood biological organisms as 
individual living beings. He evolutionized the study of the living by measuring 
how well organisms cope in the struggle for existence and how able they are in 
reproducing fertile offspring. By emphasizing struggle for existence and reproduc-
tive success, organisms are subjected to a two-way selection process, one natural 
and one sexual. Success is measured by how well organismal variation helps in 
survival and attracting mates. Both are tested within the environment. Organismal 
variation can be reduced to hereditary variation, but it is the organism that has to 
struggle. And selection can be explained by environmental parameters, but it is 
the organism that is selected, either by other organisms or by the abiotic environ-
ment. So there is a duality that takes the issues to a micro- and macrolevel, but 
only the organism–environmental interface is considered real or relevant for study. 
Organisms collectively make up populations, but for Darwin, species are real in 
name only and in reality always “incipient” and prone to undergo further gradual 
change because of generational organismal–environmental interactions that even-
tually underlie descent with modification.
Evolutionary theory has therefore been mostly defined at a mesolevel. 
Following Darwin, the founders of the Modern Synthesis argued that the evolu-
tion of existing life occurs through the natural selection of adaptive organisms at 
the level of the environment as a consequence of the weeding out of maladaptive 
organisms that did not make it, either in the struggle for existence, or the battle 
between the sexes. Consequently, the unit of selection has traditionally been iden-
tified as the phenotype or living organism, and the level where selection occurs has 
been identified as the environment. In a very real sense, expanding evolutionary 
research toward a micro- and macrolevel implies an inclusion of the dead. It avers 
a recognition that the Modern Synthesis explains biogenesis but not abiogenesis 
and merely defines evolutionary research of existing life at a mesolevel, one that is 
inspired by older cosmologies.
Discussions on micro- and macroevolution reach their peak after the founda-
tion of the Modern Synthesis and associate with advances made in fields such 
as on the one hand population and especially molecular genetics as well as 
organic  biochemistry and, on the other, paleontology, ecology, systematics, and 
 biophysics. These debates have been brought to us in the form of discussions on 
biological or genealogical and ecological hierarchies and what their epistemic 
entry points or levels of analysis are, major transitions, patterns, trends, evolution-
ary rates, and discussions on the mechanisms that cause variation, speciation, and 
(mass) extinction.
The debates invoke fundamental epistemological questions on spatiotemporal 
scales (material loci or units and levels as well as tempos of evolution), causa-
tion (mechanisms that underlie evolutionary change at these loci), and questions 
of reductionism and holism. Ultimately, they invoke an inquiry into how an evo-
lutionary worldview necessitates a reconceptualization of matter, space, and 
time. Things can hardly become more fundamental, and herein lies the important 
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contribution to science that both micro- and macro-oriented evolutionary scholars 
have brought forth.
We currently find ourselves in the midst of this fascinating cosmological revo-
lution. Although evolutionary theory was first formulated over 150 years ago, we 
are still delineating the consequences of an evolutionary worldview and the impact 
it has on our epistemic frameworks that are themselves formulated by an evolving 
species.
My background lies in evolutionary epistemology as well as comparative 
anthropological science of intellectual history, what Nietzsche called the geneal-
ogy of thought. As such, my contribution here involves an epistemic and historical 
contextualization of the evolutionary cosmological issues that the micro- and mac-
roevolutionary debates bring forth, as well as an anthropological delineation of 
two distinct scientific cultures that, although they share a common cultural ances-
tor, have evolved distinct scientific practices and intellectual ideas to study evolu-
tion. In so doing, I build on the following three books written by Niles Eldredge, 
Time Frames (1985), Reinventing Darwin, The Great Debate at the High Table 
of Evolutionary Theory (1995), and The Pattern of Evolution (1999). The present 
work reads both as a comment and as an elaboration of these ideas.
2  Microevolution
In 1946, over fifty evolutionary scholars from various biological fields united 
in the first meeting of the Society for the Study of Evolution (Eldredge 1999: 
138–40; Smocovitis 1996). The Society was an outgrowth of a North American 
National Research Committee, founded a couple of years earlier with the goal 
to investigate shared evolutionary problems of genetics and paleontology. The 
societal members elected George Gaylord Simpson as their president, and Ernst 
Mayr functioned as secretary. During their meetings, the scholars established a 
common epistemic framework for eukaryotic phylogeny: Multicellular organ-
isms undergo descent with modification because they evolve by means of natu-
ral selection. The established theoretical framework served as the foundation of 
the Modern Synthesis (Huxley 1942; Provine and Mayr 1980) that, according to 
Mayr, designates:
… the general acceptance of two conclusions: gradual evolution can be explained in 
terms of small genetic changes (“mutations”) and recombination, and the ordering of this 
genetic variation by natural selection; and the observed evolutionary phenomena, particu-
larly macro-evolutionary processes and speciation, can be explained in a manner that is 
consistent with the known genetic mechanisms. (cited in Gould 1982: 382)
Contrary to their intellectual ancestors, these founders did not address origin of life 
questions, and they stayed clear from ontogenetic and sociocultural sciences. At the 
time, there were good reasons that justified these decisions. History was no longer 
considered a science (Popper 1957). Weismann’s (1893) barrier caused for a rupture 
between ontogeny and phylogeny because scholars assumed that ontogenetically 
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acquired characteristics do not feed back into the gene pool. Consequently, embry-
ological and overall epigenetic research (Waddington 1942) was not considered 
a relevant subject area of evolutionary biology. The founders also refrained from 
sociocultural behavioral research because the subject was simply not considered to 
define their area of research. At the time, behaviorist schools considered behavior 
an outgrowth of individual and societal learning, and learned behavior in turn was 
an acquired behavior that did not feed back into the gene pool. In so far as learn-
ing is underlain by neurocognitive conditions, the subject belonged to the neuro-
logical and psychological sciences; in so far as learning requires teachers, it is a 
sociocultural group behavior that needs to be studied by anthropologists and soci-
ologists. These fields developed altogether different epistemic frameworks and sci-
entific practices to understand behavioral phenomena. The adoption of early social 
Darwinian theories had caused havoc in colonial and war times (Eliav-Feldon et al. 
2009; Fanon and Philcox 2004), and many of the founders of the Modern Synthesis 
spent a lifetime eliminating vitalist and historicist (unilineal, orthogenetic, straight 
line) evolutionary ideas. Rosalind Franklin’s work had led to the discovery of the 
double helix (Watson and Crick 1953), which later became understood as a “fro-
zen accident” (Crick 1968), and such conceptualization temporarily eliminated dis-
cussion with cytologists and cell biologists who investigated heredity beyond the 
nucleated genome (Margulis 1998: 25). Bacteriology was altogether considered 
a medical science. Bacteria, viruses, and fungi were known to genetically infect 
multicellular life during ontogeny (Avery et al. 1944; Griffith 1928; Lederberg 
and Tatum 1946; Morse et al. 1956), and such infections can alter fitness (Haldane 
1949; Lederberg 1999), but it was assumed that most infections did not enter the 
germ line and were thus negligible from an evolutionary point of view.
For an evolutionary scholar that wanted to work within the epistemic bound-
aries delineated by the Modern Synthesis, little else remained but the study of 
genes. The microevolutionary tradition developed by trying to incorporate lower- 
and higher-order phenomena on the scale, but at the same time reducing these phe-
nomena to a genetic level of analysis. Adaptation became synonymous with fitness 
(how many times genes are passed on), and natural selection became understood 
as genetic selection (Williams 1966), because ultimately, these dead structures 
are the only “survivors” and “beneficiaries” (Lloyd 1988, 2000) of evolution. By 
understanding living organisms as temporary “vehicles” that ride “selfish genes” 
(Dawkins 1976), the micromolecular genetic level is considered more lasting 
in time and therefore more real, just because genes are “replicators” that have 
“fecundity, longevity, and copying fidelity” (Dawkins 1976).
Such an approach is interesting, because it demonstrates an epistemic struggle 
with evolutionary time and a subsequent search for generational continuity and 
stability which the founders as well as Darwin proclaimed a necessary feature in 
order for natural selection to work. By taking the differential distributions of genes 
over populations as point of departure, it implies an annihilation of the individual 
living organism which had always been understood as the unit of selection. It is 
here that we therefore find a first attempt to “evolutionize” the dead, i.e., to apply 
evolutionary theory to non-living phenomena.
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I give two examples, research on kinship and research on sex. In these debates on 
the targets and beneficiaries of selection, attention was first drawn to those who from 
a genetic point of view do not benefit. Statistically speaking, kinship and altruism do 
not enhance an individual’s fitness though other members of a population can benefit 
from such cooperative actions. When asking what such traits are good for, Wynne-
Edwards (1962, 1986) raised the possibility that such traits benefit the group. But 
such higher-order selection was fiercely denied by Williams (1971) and Maynard 
Smith (1964), Maynard Smith and Price (1973). Instead, calculations began that 
enable such seemingly altruistic behavioral traits to become reduced to individual 
fitness via reciprocity or tit for tat (Axelrod 1981, Hamilton 1964). In times of com-
petition, it pays to cooperate. Nonetheless, questions of benefit are a natural out-
growth of questions on adaptation. If selection favors the fit, then traits can only 
evolve when they are somehow adaptive or they would not be selected in the first 
place. So if the individual living organism does not benefit, it must be either some-
thing above or below the organism that benefits, the group or the genes themselves.
Another conundrum, passionately studied in flower power times, was the ben-
efit of prolonged sexual immaturity, menopause and andropause, homosexual-
ity, and meiotic sex which constrains “selfish genes.” Meiotic sex (Edwards 
1998; Fisher 1930; Hamilton 1967; Maynard Smith 1978; Becks and Alavi this 
volume) involves the acceptance of half of the nucleated genes from total stran-
gers in neglect of the individual’s own genes. Why would evolution have taken 
such a route when organisms reproduced by division wherein they passed on their 
complete genome? The most common answer given was that genetic recombina-
tion is beneficial because it increases variation and it enables genetic repair or the 
masking of maladaptive traits (which the fruit fly experimenters already showed 
to be mostly recessive) in future progeny. In particular, the first argument implies 
a higher-order population level. By examining how well genes fare in a popula-
tion’s gene pool, mate choice and sexual fitness become understood as a form of 
group selection (Van Valen 1975). Given that it takes two, meiotic sex annihilates 
the sexual individual as an independent organism in favor of the study of genetic 
(re-)combinations at a population level. What matters more is the differential dis-
tribution of genes over populations through time.
Neo-Darwinian theory was very successful in reducing many seemingly social 
behaviors to a genetic level, but an equally valid question, from an epistemologi-
cal and historical point of view, is why, from all behaviors, it was particularly 
social and cooperative behavior that received so much attention. One reason is 
the following. Evolutionary theory itself evolved in the nineteenth century as an 
outgrowth of discussions on sociopolitical debates on the common goods of soci-
ety and moral debates on human nature. Without divine law, scholars sought nat-
uralistic, secular principles that enable individuals to bond into societal political 
structures. Hobbes, for example, saw humans and the whole of nature as fierce 
and violent. Rousseau endorsed that all are good-natured but corrupted by society. 
Pierre Joseph Preudhom developed his political ideas on mutualism which gave 
way to socialism. The ideas developed, with on the one side, the liberal camp that 
understood nature as “red in tooth and claw” and, on the other side, the socialists. 
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Darwin was part of the liberals and the struggle he assumed, for Spencer was one 
of the “fittest” in a world filled with “parasites.” On the other side, you had the 
socialists and communitarians, one of them being Kropotkin who emphasized 
mutual aid (see Sapp 1994 for a discussion). These features were also found in 
nature, under the form of symbiosis, mutualism, and commensalism, but these 
ideas did not survive the synthesis, or better yet, they did, but in the form of para-
sitism and “master–slave” relationships that were studied as outcomes of behavio-
ral features from within fields such as ecology. Because symbiotic behavior was 
understood as a type of socialism and studied from within ecology, the subject was 
not considered a hallmark of synthetic evolutionary studies. For Neo-Darwinians, 
who focused on the vertical transmission of nucleated genes, cooperation forms an 
anomaly. Another reason why especially sexual behavior received so much atten-
tion during the rise of microevolutionary studies is that eukaryotic sex forms a 
hallmark of natural and sexual selection theory (see Becks and Alavi this volume). 
If not for sex, traits cannot be passed on from one generation to the next. Finally, 
research on cooperation and social behavior in particular was also approved during 
the Darwin centennial, discussed in the next part.
2.1  Evolutionizing the Inorganic and Superorganic
Shortly after the Society for the Study of Evolution was founded back in 1946, 
the Darwin centennial was organized at the University of Chicago in 1959. Tax 
(1960) organized the event and invited the scholars whom Julian Huxley (1942) 
had called the founders of the Modern Synthesis (Theodosius Dobzhansky, E.B. 
Ford, Ernst Mayr, George G. Simpson, G. Ledyard Stebbins, Bernhard Rensch, 
and Sewall Wright), anthropologists, and behavioral scientists (including, among 
others, Daniel Axelrod, A. Irving Hallowell, Clyde Kluckhohn, Alfred Kroeber, 
Louis Leakey, Niko Tinbergen, Gordon Willey, and Leslie White), as well as reli-
gious leaders. The conference was organized around five panels: the origin of life, 
the evolution of life, man as an organism, the evolution of the mind, and social 
and cultural evolution, a lineup that Smocovitis (1999: 296–7) rightfully notes: 
“… follows both a logical sequence of the history of life on earth, and the logical 
ordering of knowledge: the physical sciences were followed by the biological sci-
ences and the social sciences.”
It is easy to deduce from the program that the purpose of the meeting was to 
investigate the impact an evolutionary worldview had on all the sciences, from the 
micro- to the macrolevel. Following Huxley (1942, 1957) who in turn was highly 
inspired by his grandfather Thomas Henry Huxley as well as Herbert Spencer, it 
was both a plea for “universal evolution” and an attempt to undo the “eclipse of 
Darwinism” that had originated from the 1880s onward due to advances in symbi-
ogenesis, neo-Lamarckianism, epigenetics, and embryology. Waddington was the 
only disturbance in that regard. The population geneticists had mechanized natural 
selection by mathematizing selection as gene distribution studies, and the founders 
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had put discontinuity and saltationist debates to rest, so it was now time to evolu-
tionize the behavioral and sociocultural sciences.
In comparison, during the Chicago Darwin bicentennial that was chaired by 
the philosopher Robert Richards in 2009, the main themes were eco–evo–devo 
and History and Philosophy of Science, neither of which had been represented 
at the 1959 centennial. Back in 1959, the former schools were part of the eclipse 
that needed to be undone. The latter, philosophers of science, were altogether not 
engaged, with the exception of Nagel (1949, 1951) who, a couple of years ear-
lier and from within logical positivism, had written on the use and abuse of tel-
eology in biology, and Grace A. De Laguna, who wrote a positive review of the 
conference proceedings she characterized as having taken on a “fresh approach 
to the philosophical problem of ends in nature.” In her abstract and by following 
Pittendrigh (1958), she summarizes the problem as follows:
They accept ‘teleonomy’ only as descriptive, and neglect its significance for theory. The 
present thesis is that each of the three recognized phases of universal evolution: inorganic, 
organic, and post-organic initiated by the advent of man and his culture, is characterized 
and made possible by the emergence of a distinctive type of teleonomic organization. (De 
Laguna 1962: 117)
The centennial thus reinstated in a post-synthetic and post-war spirit the attempt to 
extend the principles of natural selection to phenomena studied within the behav-
ioral, cognitive, and sociocultural sciences, in particular the “superorganic” goal-
oriented behavior of the living (Axelrod 1981; Hamilton 1964; Tinbergen 1963; 
Trivers 1971; Williams 1966). Inspired by Pittendrigh and Williams’ notions on 
teleonomy, sociobiologists (Wilson 1975) took things altogether to another level. 
Early sociobiologists assumed that behavioral and cognitive traits were ultimately 
underlain by genes, and their scientific work initiated an era where specific genes 
were postulated for language, cognition, and cultural traits. In short, such investi-
gations reinstated evolutionary research on ontogeny from within a Neo-Darwinian 
framework (Campbell 1960, 1974; Hahlweg and Hooker 1989; Tinbergen 1963).
What about the inorganic? Darwin’s On the origin of species by means of natural 
selection provides a theory of biogenesis, and it explains how existing life brings 
forth new life. He speculated that life evolved in a small little pond, a primordial 
soup, and that all living organisms are genealogically related through the blood line 
(Darwin 1859: 420–2) and thus brought forth from a single common ancestor (for a 
discussion, see Gontier 2011). But he did not go beyond this speculation to address 
the origin of life out of inorganic matter. This transition was mostly studied from 
within epigenetic circles (for a discussion, see Maienschein 2012), where schol-
ars investigated abiogenesis by means of spontaneous generation instead of natural 
selection, to explain how the living evolved out of inanimate matter. The doctrine 
was called to halt by scholars such as Redi and Pasteur, who reintroduced more pre-
formationist notions by defending that Omne vivum ex vivo, all life comes from pre-
existing life. This credo also formed the basis for cell theory, which takes the cell as 
the basic unit of life and argues that all life comes from cells (Mazzarello 1999). The 
view strengthened Darwin’s evolutionary theory that all life shares a common origin 
wherefrom descent with modification follows (for a discussion, see Huxley 1870).
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Thinking through the consequences of Darwinian evolution theory, and in the 
context of research on the origin of life, Haeckel (1866) and Huxley (1870), who 
coined the term abiogenesis and also denied it, were the first to universalize evolu-
tionary theory toward the inorganic. Comparative research led Haeckel to theorize 
that “higher animals” had evolved from “protozoa” such as “monera” and subse-
quently diversified into kingdoms (“Protista,” Animalia, and Plantae). He depicted 
his monophyletic reconstructions in the first evolutionary trees of life that in turn 
gave credibility to his recapitulation theory alternatively known as his biogenetic 
law (literally, the law of the genesis or historical origin of life). During the First 
World War, he published a work on crystals which he characterized as “anor-
ganic life” (Haeckel 1917) wherein he came very close to the work so typical of 
biophysics.
Returning to the Chicago 1959 centennial, what is interesting, and very reflec-
tive of the time, is the differentiation the organizers made between origin and evo-
lution of life problems which they examined in two distinct panels. Back then, 
origin questions were frowned upon as speculative and unscientific because the 
initial conditions can neither be repeated nor observed, though today progress is 
indeed being made in that regard. But such scientific demands equally go out to 
the future, which we can neither observe nor induce, yet prediction is valued as 
one of the highest epistemic goods of any scientific theory. Equally, “what is life” 
questions are also often dismissed as unscientific, while on the contrary, mechani-
cal questions on how life evolved, and thus, identifying the mechanisms of evolu-
tion is considered science. The 1959 panel on the origin of life was composed of 
physicists, biochemists, geneticists, and ecologists who focused on the ecological 
conditions favorable to evolve eukaryotic life on earth, the biochemical aspects of 
the double helix, and the evolution of physiology, especially nerve wirings.
The structure of genetic material had been discovered 6 years earlier through 
X-ray crystallography, and topics included how genes mutate and how they 
underlie general animal physiology. Analyzing the panel, it altogether remains a 
strange combination of scholars and topics. Participants included the astrobiol-
ogist Harlow Shapley, a participant of the great debate on the size of the universe 
and its nebulae (galaxies), who also introduced the “liquid water belt theory” that 
defines habitable zones for life; Sir Charles Galton Darwin, descendent of Darwin 
and physicist involved in X-ray crystallography; Hermann Joseph Muller, a Nobel 
laureate known for his work on the impact radiation has on genetic mutations; 
the geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky and biochemist Earl A. Evans; Ralph W. 
Gerard, a neurophysiologist and behavioral scientist working on the chemico- 
electric wirings of the central nervous system; Clifford Ladd Prosser, a compara-
tive physiologist; Georgii F. Gause, a Russian biologist known for his ecological 
competitive exclusion principle that states that only one of two similar species 
competing over the same niche will survive (the other one will go extinct); and 
Hans Gaffron, a biochemist working on photosynthesis in plants.
One can only interpret such a selection for a panel on the origin of life from 
within the bias there existed among the founders of the Modern Synthesis 
and their predecessors to understand the evolution of multicellular life and to 
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understand that evolution exclusively by means of natural selection. Granted, great 
scientists such as Manfred Eigen (Eigen and Schuster 1977), Orgel (1973, 1992) 
and De Duve (1991) or the Schopf (1978) brothers and Fox and Dose (1972) were 
still coming of academic age (which on average takes a decade or two longer). But 
by then, Wallin (1927) had published his work on symbiogenesis, Pauling (1939) 
had already received the Nobel prize for his work on the nature of the chemical 
bond, Miller (1953) had performed his experiments on the primordial atmosphere 
of life that spontaneously generated amino acids, and Oparin’s (1955) work had 
been translated and was well read within the Americas and Europe. Luria and 
Delbruck (1943), in discussions on Lamarckian versus Darwinian inheritance and 
the occurrence of mutations as random or directed toward environmental change, 
gave statistical evidence that bacteria mutate randomly and only subsequently 
become the target of selection. Avery et al. (1944), who pointed out that DNA and 
not proteins were the transforming factor during, what we now call, lateral gene 
transfer among strands of pneumococci were also not invited, and neither was 
Lederberg (1951, Zinder and Lederberg 1952), who discovered the mechanisms 
of transduction and bacterial conjugation and reintroduced the term abiogenesis 
before Carl Sagan did.
Perhaps funding ran out, but the composition of the 1959 Origin of Life panel 
does demonstrate a conscious selection of favoured topics as well as a lack of 
scholarly interaction between the founders of the Modern Synthesis and pioneers 
in areas such as abiogenesis, actual molecular genetics as opposed to theoretical 
population genetics, cytoplasmic heredity, and prokaryotic life. In their defense, it 
is true that such inclusion would not have involved a celebration of natural selec-
tion or Darwin per se. But in so far as they endorsed universal evolution and even 
accepted the possibility for selection to be directed as opposed to blind in what 
regards sociocultural evolution, much more so than later sociobiologists would, it 
remains strange why, besides selection, there appears to have been no room what-
soever for symbiogenesis or spontaneous generation (or self-organizing, autocata-
lytic complex adaptive systems as we call them today). Spontaneously generated, 
biochemical catalytic and autocatalytic systems show selectiveness, but much of 
this can be explained by electromagnetics, physics, and chemistry, rather than by 
struggle for existence and competition. This is one of the reasons why such views 
were not favoured at a time when biology was seeking its own field-specific and 
epistemic boundaries. Wright (1929, 1932) was there to defend drift, but he was 
part of the evolution panel, and drift, before Kimura (1968, 1983), was understood 
as a period of no selection rather than as a mechanism in and of itself.
Nonetheless, in relation to post-synthetic introductions of origin of life debates, 
and battles over which came first, genes (Eigen and Schuster 1977; Orgel 1973, 
1992), proteins (Miller 1953; Miller and Urey 1959; Kauffman and Levin 1987; 
Kauffman 1995), or cells (De Duve 1991; Fox and Dose 1972; Oparin 1955), the 
inorganic eventually became evolutionized. Today, all known evolutionary theories 
(natural selection, symbiogenesis, spontaneous generation or self-organized com-
plex adaptive systems theory, lateral gene transfer, drift, punctuated equilibria) are, 
to some extent, put to use to understand abiogenesis.
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It was especially Eigen (1996: 547), who selectionized the inorganic or 
 “prebiotic” by asking whether “‘being alive’ really [is] a necessary prerequisite of 
selective and evolutionary behavior.” His theory on the autocatalytic hypercycle 
explains, from a selectionist point of view, the origin of autocatalytic RNA mol-
ecules and DNA compartmentalization into larger genomes. His background in 
physics and his adherence to Shannon’s rising information theory even enabled 
him to turn natural selection into a physical law of functional optimization toward 
increasing complexity:
That is how a physical interpretation of the Darwinian principle might sound. According 
to Darwin’s principle, whatever is better adapted spreads out and displaces its less 
well adapted predecessor. Thus, complexity, built upon simplicity, has accumulated 
throughout biological evolution from the first single-celled organisms to human beings. 
Evolution as a whole is the steady generation of information - information that is written 
down in the genes of living organisms. … Today we can apply our knowledge to molecu-
lar systems such as genes and the products of their translation. We can also investigate 
in a much more objective way the physical nature of the Darwinian principle: theoreti-
cally, by defining accurately the prerequisites and constraints, and experimentally, by 
exact control of experimental conditions. We find that the selection principle is neither 
a mystical axiom immanent in living matter nor a general tendency observable primar-
ily in living processes. On the contrary, it is - like many of the known physical laws - a 
clear ‘if-then’ principle, that is, a principle according to which defined initial situations 
lead to deducible behavior patterns. It is thus analogous to the law of mass action, which 
regulates the attainment of the quantities of the components in a chemical equilibrium.  
(Eigen 1997: 17–8)
It is a complex theory, but the short version is that within genetic landscapes—
to be read quite literally, in the context of (pre-)RNA worlds (Cech 1986; Gilbert 
1986), not the wild type, but the most optimal variations of the wild type (the 
quasi-species) together as a group are the target of selection. In order for the 
quasi-species to overthrow the wild type (and thus to evolve by splitting), it needs 
to be more optimal. It is a bit like the “hill-climbing” metaphor Dawkins (1996) 
uses to describe what he calls “accumulative selection.” Eigen (1996: 19):
Selection contains an element of exact ‘if-then’ behavior. It has nothing to do with the 
 tautological interpretation ‘best adapted = selected’. ‘Selection’ could in principle just 
refer to any kind of preference. But here it means a particular kind of preference, which 
adheres unerringly to a single scale of values. Selection is based upon self-replication. It 
distinguishes sharply between competitors, it constructs a broad mutant spectrum on the 
basis of value, and in this way it organizes and steers the entire, complex system.
Selection becomes understood as replication of preferential information. Eigen 
and Dawkins’ ideas find their roots in the works of Fisher (1930) and Wright 
(1929), with that very important difference that Eigen saw his ideas on natu-
ral selection as a physical law restricted to the early “life” of replicators (RNA 
and DNA molecules and viruses). Eigen therefore pointed out the limit of natural 
selection. As soon as there is a distinction between a genotype and a phenotype 
(and thus an established translation machinery), he argued that selection occurs 
at the level of the cell, which is different from how selection occurs at the level of 
replicators.
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The chief criticism of Darwin’s idea was directed against its supposed claim to explain 
all of evolution. However, the development of life, from molecular systems to human 
beings, has passed through many stages of organisation, and, while some of these were 
Darwinian in nature, many were fundamentally different. Since the preservation of all liv-
ing systems is based upon reproduction, selection plays a role at all levels. But selection 
is expressed in many different ways, sometimes as coexistence or even cooperation, and 
sometimes as competition and the often irreversible weeding-out of some forms of life.  
(Eigen 1996: 29–30)
Eigen’s introduction of information theory and focus on increasing levels of com-
plexity and optimization also inspired scholars such as Szathmáry (2002, 2006), 
and other researchers interested in the major transitions of life, as well as schol-
ars that form part of the field of biosemiotics. For Eigen, for example, the ori-
gin of autocatalytic replicators, and their compartmentalization into a genome, 
was a transition that marked a “peculiar ‘once-forever’—selection mechanism 
[…] a consequence of hypercyclic organization” (Eigen and Schuster 1977: 
542). Oparin, for example, once asked why life does not originate de novo on a 
daily basis. The most popular answer in his time was that existing life takes up 
all resources, which is an ecological argument. The answer scholars like Eigen, 
Jacob (1977), or Monod (1971) gave is that it is so unlikely an event, that if it 
were to happen once, it will most definitely not happen twice due to the complex-
ity involved. Life genealogically builds upon what exists, and what exists is the 
outcome of once-forever events, likely at the time, but often not repeatable there-
after. This tinkering argument is based upon an understanding of genes as carrying 
an increasingly complex informational code, and just because of its emphasis on 
information and increasing complexity, it is so popular with creationists (Hoyle 
1981), whom assume that such tinkering requires an intelligent designer.
Nonetheless, if the origin of the genetic code was a “once-forever” event, 
another way of stating the latter is as follows: However the genome evolved, 
it is unique to that period. In so far as the situation of viruses resembles that 
realm, probably because they too are remnants of that particular phase (see, e.g., 
Villarreal 2004; Villarreal and Defillips 2000), they too can be studied as exam-
ples of hypercyclic organization. But beyond that, the law of selection stops and 
selection takes on different forms, sometimes as co-evolution, sometimes it is 
completely overthrown by other mechanisms and thus, itself, as a mechanism, not 
selected simply because the if-then conditions are not met. If correct, then such a 
view would imply a higher-order sorting or selection of evolutionary mechanisms. 
One of the challenges we are faced with is understanding how various and dis-
tinct evolutionary mechanisms work together to bring forth the phenomenon that 
 evolution is.
Finally, ecology, for the founders as well as the organizers of the centennial, 
was by and large reduced to the study of genetic landscapes (Serrelli this volume), 
as well as the conditions for habitable life on earth. Research on both ontogeny 
and ecology (Odling-Smee 1988; Van Valen 1973, 1976), which are both areas of 
research that were first defined by Haeckel, became reintroduced in standard Neo-
Darwinian theories from the 1960s and 1970s onward, partly because of advances 
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in symbiosis and symbiogenesis (Margulis 1970, 1981) and partly due to advances 
in macroevolutionary fields, including biophysics. Eldredge (1985b, 1989, 1992), 
Gould (1977), Lewontin (1983, 2000), Gould and Lewontin (1979), and Stanley 
(1979; Eldredge and Stanley 1984), for example, were quite active in reinstating 
ecology, ontogeny, and biophysics as valid sub-branches of the Neo-Darwinian 
framework. I return to this later in the text.
Today, the movements evolved into, on the one hand, the new sociocultural 
evolutionary sciences, including evolutionary psychology, evolutionary linguistics, 
and evolutionary anthropology (for a review, see Gontier 2012a) and, on the other 
hand, the schools that associate with eco–evo–devo research. Eco–evo–devo today 
reinstates a mesolevel analysis between the biomolecular (micro) and ecological 
and systematic (macro) sciences. Within the sociocultural sciences, especially the 
work of Jablonka and Lamb (1989) and Oyama (1985) was foundational. Typical 
of the eco–evo–devo approach is that scholars try to define and map actual life 
history, by, e.g., correlating genes with organismal phenotypes and sociocultural, 
biotic, and abiotic environments. On the other hand, work on symbiosis and sym-
biogenesis and reticulate evolution in general remains poorly integrated in Neo-
Darwinian theory.
2.2  Universalizing Selection
One of the reasons why the microevolutionary tradition has been so successful is 
that it has been able to “universalize” (Cziko 1995; Dawkins 1982a; Dennett 1995) 
natural selection theory into a common scientific language, not by searching for 
the law that natural selection can be (as Eigen had demonstrated), but the pattern 
that natural selection produces as well as the parameters that need to be present for 
natural selection to work. These parameters and patterns have been mostly formu-
lated in the form of heuristics. Starting with the units and levels of selection debate 
(Brandon and Burian 1984), evolutionary epistemologists (Bradie 1986) and evo-
lutionary biologists have identified “universal” units of selection such as the repli-
cator (Dawkins 1982a), the interactor (Hull 1981), and the reproducer (Griesemer 
2000), and they have been engaged in identifying the levels where selection occurs 
(Brandon 1982; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Okasha 2005). Such research relates to 
hierarchy theory and the quest for the major transitions, or patterns and trends of 
life that especially natural selection, understood as the selection of information, 
has brought forth in all domains of life (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995; see 
Brandon and McShea 2010 for a critique).
Overall, the universalization of selection is characterized by abstracting a gen-
eral template from natural selection that provides information on how the mech-
anism works (Gontier 2006a, b). This template can then be used as a heuristic 
to study the evolution of genes, organisms, culture, cognition, and language. In 
biology, Lewontin (1970: 1) has defined such a template or “logical skeleton” of 
natural selection as “phenotypic variation, differential fitness, and heritability of 
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that fitness.” And ten years earlier, Campbell (1960), the founder of evolutionary 
epistemology, argued that such a general formula of natural selection is “blind 
variation and selective retention.” This means that as soon as one can identify 
something that varies blindly and is selectively retained, that something evolves 
by means of natural selection. In sum, the work by scholars engaged in universal 
selectionism has led to finding (1) more units and levels of selection and (2) the 
conditions under which natural selection operates, conditions they formulate in the 
form of a heuristic, logical skeleton, or formula.
Both approaches are today somewhat being synthesized into the new and rising 
field of Biosemiotics (Barbieri 2008a, b; Favereau 2005; Hoffmeyer 2008), where, 
as the name implies, the evolution of informational codes serves as a new means 
to delineate the major transitions of life from within a more historical perspective.
3  Macroevolution
In his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn (1962) characterized scientific 
practice as a paradigm, defined in his preface as “scientific achievements that 
for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practition-
ers.” Scientific development goes through distinct phases from preparadigm and 
paradigm formation phases, to phases of paradigm execution, and paradigm ref-
ormation or scientific revolutions. The latter result from how well scientific 
frameworks deal with anomalies that challenge the tenets of an accepted para-
digm. Anomalies cause paradigm instability and scientific crisis. Either scientists 
are able to solve the anomalies from within the standard epistemic framework, or 
they develop another paradigm that either solves the issues or gives hope that it 
eventually will.
The historical developments of Darwinian and Neo-Darwinian evolution-
ary theories follow Kuhn’s description of scientific revolutions quite accurately. 
Darwin (1859) did not find evidence for the fixity of species, which was a tenet 
in the standard paradigm of his time. Instead, his voyages had made him come 
to believe that species evolve. He knew that if true, his ideas would cause for a 
scientific revolution. Calling his Origin of Species “one long argument,” Darwin 
(1859: 495) recognized that he had merely provided a hypothesis based upon gen-
eralizations of observable artificial selection in animal and plant breeding. For 
such a generalization to become a theory, rigorous scientific testing and proof was 
needed. In Chaps. 6 and 9, Darwin also pointed out anomalies or objections to his 
arguments. One of them was the lack of evidence for intermediate forms (“insen-
sibly graded series,” Eldredge 1995: 95) in the fossil record. Darwin countered the 
objection by arguing that not his hypothesis, but the fossil record was incomplete.
During the “eclipse of Darwinism,” other anomalies were found (see Bowler 
2003 for an overview). The rediscovery of Mendelian genetics and the intro-
duction of mutation theory questioned Darwin’s gemmules theory and his ideas 
on genetic blending. More discontinuous and saltational views emerged as a 
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consequence (see Gould 1977, 2002 for an overview). These anomalies were 
solved from within the evolutionary paradigm by the theoretical population geneti-
cists who synthesized natural selection theory with Mendelian heredity laws and 
who advanced a more gradual and continuous interpretation of genetic mutations 
(see Schwartz 1999 for an overview). The scholars provided mathematical and 
experimental proof for the theory of evolution and turned the hypothesis into a sci-
entific theory, Neo-Darwinism, that formed the basis for paradigm selection by the 
founders of the Modern Synthesis.
Neo-Darwinist population geneticists are best regarded as executers of the pro-
gram. They have been solving anomalies that phenomena such as altruistic and 
sociocultural behavior and eukaryotic sex pose to the Neo-Darwinian framework. 
By incorporating below and above organismal phenomena, they have had to make 
compromises to both Darwin’s original theory of natural selection and the syn-
thetic framework, but at the same time, they have been able to expand its scope 
and application range.
The macroevolutionary perspective as we know it today has been introduced 
from within the field of paleontology by Niles Eldredge and Stephen J. Gould in 
the early 1970s when the Modern Synthesis was well formed and on the expand-
ing. Eldredge and Gould started out as executers of that particular program, but in 
so doing, they found anomalies that lead to crisis. Scholars in this tradition accept 
the lack of intermediates in the fossil record as a fact, they find evidence for peri-
ods of stasis, and they demonstrate that speciation and extinction are events that 
often occur rapidly. Scholars on both sides of the scale are currently investigating 
whether the Neo-Darwinian framework can overcome this crisis that research on 
stasis, speciation/extinction, and the lack of intermediates introduces, or whether 
the findings necessitate a scientific revolution.
When studying the evolution of trilobites, Phacops rana and Phacops iowensis 
which Eldredge (1971: 162) called “true biospecies,” he did not find intermedi-
ate species. Instead, he encountered long periods of morphological stasis within 
the trilobites, and when variation in eye lenses did come along, older forms were 
rapidly replaced. Speciation was a rare event rather than a natural outcome of 
incessant and continuous anagenetic evolving which would imply intermedi-
ates (for a detailed description, see Eldredge 1985a). The speciation events that 
occurred appeared to have been driven by the spatiotemporal distributions of the 
species; geography, group size, and how ecological regions are populated by real 
individuals as opposed to how genes map onto genetic landscapes. New traits 
become fixed in marginal groups isolated from their parental species, and they 
split and rapidly replace the older population. In other words, Eldredge explained 
morphological change of trilobites by making use of Mayr’s model of allopatric 
speciation by peripheral isolates and saw it as an anomaly to “phyletic gradual-
ism” that endorsed speciation to occur through anagenesis where species “gradu-
ally and systematically evolve themselves out of existence” (Eldredge 1995: 69). 
For Eldredge, Mayr’s model explained the gaps he found in successive strata. But 
he went further, by arguing that such a model annihilates the necessity to postu-
late intermediates, and furthermore encourages the idea that most species evolve 
through cladogenesis.
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The majority of species preserved in epeiric sediments show no change in species-spe-
cific characters throughout the interval of their stratigraphic occurrence, and the phyletic 
model is inapplicable to most of these elements of the fossil record. Instead, change in, or 
development of, species-specific characters are envisioned as occurring relatively rapidly 
in peripheral isolates. Morphological stability of epeiric species is attributed to stabilizing 
selection. (Eldredge 1971: 166)
At first, Eldredge explained morphological stasis as a form of stabilizing selection, 
and later and inspired by Vrba (1980, 1985a, b), Lieberman (2000; Lieberman 
et al. 1993, 1995, 2005, 2007), Lieberman and Dudgeon (1996), Lieberman et al. 
(1995, 2007), Eldredge et al. (2005) would understand it as an outcome of drift 
and habitat tracking. A parallel with Sewall Wright’s shifting balance theory was 
first made by Thomas Schopf in the introduction to the first punctuated equilibria 
paper (Eldredge and Gould 1972). By denying that genetic selection plays suffi-
cient role, drift and habitat tracking are recognized as independent mechanisms, 
not merely the result of a genetic level in evolution; rather, they add an  ecological 
level, very much in the same way as Hubbel (2001) applies ecological drift to 
describe biodiversity and biogeography (Rosindell et al. 2011).
Returning to the 1970s, around the American Museum of Natural History and 
Columbia University, a group had been developing where Eldredge would become 
part of. Together with Stephen J. Gould, who found the same results in land snails, 
Eldredge published the consequences of their findings a year later (Eldredge and 
Gould 1972). Their conclusions can be summarized as follows:
1. Gaps in the fossil record are real, and when no intermediates are found, then 
there is no “insensibly graded fossil sequence” (Eldredge and Gould 1972: 87);
2. Inspired by Hennigian cladistics of genealogical or ancestral–descent relation-
ships (Eldredge 1971: 157); in anticipation of Ghiselin’s (1974) notion of spe-
cies as biological individuals, they claimed that “biospecies” are real because 
they have stratigraphic and thus historical existence (a beginning, life span, and 
ending in time p. 92), and species demonstrate a type of stasis or “homeosta-
sis” that surpasses “genetic revolution” (a term coined by Mayr, p. 114)—they 
never denied the occurrence of genetic mutations or the importance of genetic 
selection, what they claimed was that neither suffice to cause speciation;
3. Speciation is rare, but when it occurs, it occurs rapidly and species evolve by 
splitting because of allopatric speciation by peripheral isolates (p. 96);
4. The history of life is characterized by punctuated equilibria rather than by phy-
letic gradualism, and the former is a consequence of “the theory of allopatric 
speciation” and “implies that a lineage’s history includes long periods of mor-
phological stability, punctuated here and there by rapid events of speciation in 
isolated subpopulations” (pp. 108–10);
5. Trends are real (p. 110);
6. The Modern Synthesis is biased toward phyletic gradualism, but macroevolu-
tion (understood as the evolution of species or speciation) and also stasis of 
species cannot be fully explained by microevolutionary theory by which they 
meant genetic selection theory—the critique goes out to microevolutionary 
schools of thought much more than it goes out to Darwinism or general evolu-
tionary theory as some creationists have falsely claimed.
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In a Popperian sense, one anomaly rightfully disproves all, but it would only be 
the beginning of a long series of publications where scholars would confirm both 
their results and the pattern of stasis and rapid speciation in numerous lineages 
(reviewed in Gould and Eldredge 1977, 1993), including our own (Eldredge and 
Tattersall 1982; Gabrowski and Wood this volume). In a way, it was neither the 
trilobites or the snails, nor their theory of punctuated equilibria that made the dif-
ference. The major conclusion was that an exclusive focus on genetic distributions 
and population levels so typical of the microevolutionary perspective did not fully 
explain speciation and large-scale trends. Their work marked a beginning of a 
fresh breath of air for paleontologists who, ever since Darwin, were treated like 
the stepchildren of evolution. Eldredge and Gould’s work justified other scholars 
to speak up against the claims of the Synthesis, in favor of what the data and the 
fossil record actually said. It marked a beginning of macroevolutionary thought as 
distinct from microevolution and a celebration of the work performed by paleon-
tologists, systematists, and ecologists which had been eclipsed.
3.1  “Evolutionizing the Dead” by Means of Organicism
Like microevolutionary scholars, macroevolutionary scholars have also intro-
duced an inclusion of “the dead” by emphasizing the evolutionary impact that 
phenomena traditionally not conceived as living have. Macroevolutionary schol-
ars recognize species and higher taxa such as genera and phyla as historically real 
entities that occupy space and time. The species–genera distinction was introduced 
by Aristotle. In Judeo-Christian tradition, which was more influenced by Plato, 
it was believed that species were created by God according to fixed prototypes. 
Taxonomic classification, including Linnaean systematics, was nonetheless under-
stood as a theoretical and logical discipline, where universals and particulars were 
distinguished based upon logical dichotomies. As theoretical frameworks, they 
showed the order of the universe, but like any universalia (theoretical concepts), 
their independent existence was questioned by nominalists and accepted by  realists 
(for a discussion, see Gontier 2011). Darwin adhered to a nominalistic species 
concept, thereby claiming that species are not real, but Mayr (1942) introduced 
his biological species concept that defines species based upon sexual exclusion. 
He did so out of necessity because the gene population point of view annihilates 
the living sexual individual. And his theory of allopatric speciation due to periph-
eral isolates equally demarcated species in ecological terms. With Mayr, species 
become understood as bounded in space and time, due to sexual compatibility and 
geographical accessibility requirements. Eldredge and Gould took the reasoning 
further by “evolutionizing” and “geneologizing” not only species but also higher 
taxa. I give two examples, one from Eldredge’s work and one from Gould’s.
For Eldredge (1999: 22–3), species are “real entities, ‘individuals’ with births, 
histories, and deaths.” They are real genealogical entities that occupy an equally 
real ecological space in the history of life. When Ghiselin (1974) introduced his 
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ideas of species as biological individuals, an approach Eldredge adopted, Ghiselin 
quite literally, revitalized the organic notion of beings that was so typical of pre-
synthetic evolutionary and historical thinkers of the nineteenth century. Back then, 
languages and cultures were considered real organic and organismic beings or nat-
ural kinds as philosophers call it. All have a birth, life history, and ending in time 
from which linguistic, cultural, and sociopolitical genealogies could be inferred. 
Because they were beings, they even reproduced, though not by replication, but by 
splitting (diffusion) or merging (cultural blending or acculturation, Gontier 2006c; 
Kressing et al. 2014). Inspired by linguistics and language genealogies, Darwin 
argued that all biological organisms are also genealogically related through what 
we call genetics and what he called the blood line (discussed in Gontier 2011). 
The discovery of genetic material and Weismann’s barrier blocked such continu-
ity, and anthropological fields would introduce notions of historical particular-
ism instead, claiming that no genealogy of sociocultural knowledge can be drawn 
because every culture has its unique and particular history. The unique and par-
ticular history of biological species, in turn, was genealogized by Hennig who 
revitalized the idea of natural kinds, and this work was foundational for Ghiselin 
when he argued that species are biological individuals.
By building on both Hennig’s cladistics that are a “truly ‘scientific’ way of 
deriving evolutionary histories and taxonomies” (Eldredge 1999: 8) and Ghiselin’s 
work, Eldredge understands species as real historical entities, beings or  individuals 
that occupy space and time. Species genealogies are more stable in time than the 
individual organisms that make them up. His research studies on stasis (Eldredge 
et al. 2005), living fossils (Eldredge and Stanley 1984), extinctions (Eldredge 
1991a, b), and biodiversity (1992, 1997; Casetta and Marques da Silva this volume) 
are investigations into the geological life span, the actual natural history of species, 
both in what regards their origin, genealogy and ending, as well as in what regards 
their relation to the natural environment. As an ardent environmentalist, much of 
Eldredge’s career has also focused on “biologizing” and “evolutionizing” the abi-
otic environment. The abiotic environment is relevant for understanding biological 
evolution, not as a level where genetic selection occurs, but as an evolutionary and 
causal factor that impacts the evolution of life.
Echoing some of Darwin’s strongest themes and denials, modern evolutionary biology 
emphasizes genes and biotic interactions at the expense of explicit links to the physical 
world. Ecology plays a muted role in evolutionary theory. And patterns in the history of 
life – patterns strongly linked with the physical history of the earth – still await full inte-
gration with evolutionary theory. (Eldredge 1999: 95)
That ecology is real becomes most clear in his distinction between an ecologi-
cal/economic and genealogical hierarchy (a distinction he first made in 1985, 
but for an overview, see Eldredge 2008). That surely was not part of the Modern 
Synthesis, but it can be incorporated into a reworked version, in so far as Darwin 
himself attributed more causality to the environment than his predecessors did.
We also find this idea with Gould (1989: 228) who argued that “Evolutionary 
change (as opposed to mere variation) is produced by forces of natural selection aris-
ing from the external environment (both physical conditions and interactions with 
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other organisms).” Nonetheless, Gould (1977) was more inspired by developmental 
and genetic studies. Contrary to Eldredge, who explained stasis as the outcome of sta-
bilizing selection and later drift, Gould investigated the “homeostatic” life span of spe-
cies as a possible consequence of ontogenetic constraints (Gould 1977) and genetic 
aging (Gould et al. 1987). By understanding eukaryotic genera and clades as real 
historical individuals, that have a beginning, life span, and ending in time, he studied 
that life span or genealogy by looking for trends in eukaryotic multicellular evolution 
that indicate a “new arrow of time to specify the direction of evolution” (Gould et al. 
1987: 1437). In association with the MBL group (for overviews, see Sepkoski and 
Ruse 2009), Gould investigated clade typology and concluded that the evolution of 
marine invertebrates and terrestrial mammals, among others, portrays a maximal dis-
parity (rather than adaptive radiation which he rejected as a notion, Gould et al. 1987: 
1438) or “bottom-heaviness” at the beginning of the clade. This bottom-heaviness 
is followed by rapid decimation and subsequent species diversification within a few 
remaining lineages. Gould (1989: 304) interpreted this bottom-heaviness as:
early experimentation and later standardization. Major lineages seem able to generate 
remarkable disparity of anatomical design at the outset of their history – early experimen-
tation. Few of these designs survive an initial decimation, and later diversification occurs 
only within the restricted anatomical boundaries of these survivors – later standardization.
Dawkins had launched the notion that genes are the ultimate survivors of selec-
tion. Inspired by Lerner and Valentine, Gould asked whether genetic systems 
do age. By believing that “organisms as well as environments were different in 
Cambrian times, […] the explosion and later quiescence owes as much to a 
change in organic potential as to an altered ecological status” (Gould 1989: 230). 
He assumed that early multicellular life, though morphologically different, had 
a “shared genetic heritage, now dissipated” (Ibid.: 231–2). Since the Middle 
Cambrian, a period in life that is well preserved in the Burgess Shale Formation 
currently in the Canadian Rockies of British Columbia, no new phyla or “body 
plans,” as he called them, have evolved, for which he raised the possibility that the 
genetic systems had aged. Gould was a true visionary of the evo–devo schools that 
emerged with the discovery of the homeobox gene complex (Gehring 1992) and 
regulatory, homeotic genes in general (Davidson and Erwin 2009), when he wrote:
I have no profound suggestions about the potential nature of this genetic ‘aging’, but sim-
ply ask that we consider such an alternative. Our exploding knowledge of development 
and the mechanisms of genetic action should provide, within a decade, the facts and ideas 
to flesh out this conception. […] We cannot, for now, go beyond such crude and prelimi-
nary suggestions. (Gould 1989: 231)
Gould found the anomalies less commensurable with Neo-Darwinian theory, 
though he too emphasized repeatedly that he himself was a Darwinist, because 
Darwin himself was a pluralist. For Gould (1982: 383):
The non-Darwinian implications of punctuated equilibrium lie in its suggestions for the 
explanation of evolutionary trends […] not in the tempo of individual speciation events. 
Although punctuated equilibrium is a theory for a higher level of evolutionary change, 
and must therefore be agonistic with respect to the role of natural selection in speciation, 
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the world that it proposes is quite different from that traditionally viewed by palaeon-
tologists (and by Darwin himself) as the proper geological extension of Darwinism. The 
“gradualist-punctuationalist debate”, the general label often applied to this disparate series 
of claims, may not be directed at the heart of natural selection, but it remains an important 
critique of the Darwinian tradition.
Because both Eldredge and Gould understand higher taxa as real, (mass) extinc-
tion and origination/speciation are equally real phenomena, and their history in 
time and space can become documented. Another logical outcome is research on 
both biological/genealogical and ecological hierarchies (Tëmkin and Eldredge this 
volume). In that regard, and as a part-time historian of science, Gould (1981) was 
more interested in debunking cultural biases of the scale, while Eldredge has been 
actively engaged in developing new hierarchical frameworks.
Finally, if species are real, it raises questions on species sorting. In fact, if all higher 
taxa, such as kingdoms or phyla, are real because they demarcate actual historical 
groups in space and time that can be delineated based upon ecological niches, geo-
logical strata, morphological layout, and mechanisms according to which they evolve, 
one could in principle ask whether there exists some type of sorting from Woese and 
Fox (1977) three domains downward. Eldredge and Gould kept it to questions of spe-
cies sorting and developed the ideas further in collaboration with Vrba (1989), Vrba 
and Eldredge (1984), Vrba and Gould (1986). The rationale is that in so far as natural 
selection in combination with drift and abiotic factors causally influences speciation, it 
becomes natural to ask whether any or all somehow influence speciation to be differ-
ential and thus to show trends or arrows in time. Eldredge (1999: 23):
If species are construed as real historical entities – with the aforementioned births, histo-
ries, and deaths – that in itself suggests the very real possibility that there are factors that 
bias those births and deaths. And that means that there very probably is a higher-level ana-
logue to natural selection – species selection, or, as I have come to prefer, species sorting. 
The apparent directionality of trends, we suggested, might be the result of, say, differen-
tial species survival …
Species, as biological beings, reproduce, not by replication, but by splitting or 
cladogenesis, and as such also introduce a pattern of descent with modification 
that is in turn characterized by punctuated equilibria rather than phyletic gradu-
alism. For Gould, the importance of punctuated equilibria had been that it lent 
insight into such trends:
At the macroevolutionary level of trends, the theory of punctuated equilibrium proposes 
that established species generally do not change substantially in phenotype over a life-
time that may encompass many million years (stasis), and that most evolutionary change 
is concentrated in geologically instantaneous events of branching speciation. […] (Gould 
1982: 383)
Returning to Kuhn, does macroevolutionary research call for a revolution? Gould 
was more revolutionary than Eldredge. For Eldredge (1985b), the Synthesis is 
merely “unfinished,” and he takes: “… being called anti-Darwinian very personally. 
… I have always thought of myself as more or less a knee-jerk Neo-Darwinian” 
who has “felt that, with one or two major exceptions, my version of how the evolu-
tionary process works lines up very well with Darwin’s” (Eldredge 2006: 36).
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He accepts, as Thomas Huxley did, that the theory of natural selection does 
not necessitate gradualness, and he understands his ideas as a geological exten-
sion of Darwinian theory, which is why he has tried to time speciation based upon 
geological strata. But the fact of the matter is that by understanding speciation 
as an outcome of ecological and geographical factors, much more so than as a 
consequence of genetic selection, he attributes causation to the abiotic environ-
ment rather than understanding it as the mere scene or level where genetic selec-
tion occurs.
Migration was one of the four elements of the Modern Synthesis, but if habi-
tat tracking or niche construction have causal influence on the future course of 
evolution, then, as Lewontin (2000) pointed out, such selective behavior goes 
out from active organisms rather than selective environments that weed out pas-
sive individuals (also see Stigall this volume). The field of ecology was not part 
of the Modern Synthesis and became introduced post-synthetically, in both the 
micro- and macroevolutionary schools. Ecologically oriented scholars have done 
excellent work in finding causal factors that explain stasis, evolution, and extinc-
tion (Futuyma this volume; Bokma this volume) that go beyond genetic selection. 
These include drift, habitat-tracking, abiotic environmental changes, developmen-
tal constraints, and biophysical constraints as well as affordances. Such research 
has created a scientific necessity to integrate environmentalist and  ecological 
approaches into the evolutionary discipline. Quite often, the environment  provides 
causal non-genetic factors that influence how species originate, evolve, and die. 
Climate change, meteor impacts, soil, and atmosphere composition all can influ-
ence the evolutionary faith of species and higher taxa. Thermodynamic and other 
physical laws (Bohm 1980; Kauffman 1995; Prigogine 1980; Stanley 1979; 
Stanley this volume; Thompson 1917; von Bertalanffy 1928, 1940, 1950) also 
play crucial roles, as enablers as well as constrainers in both the formation of bio-
chemical and anatomical form and its development and extinction. Ecology, sys-
tematics, and biophysics today are on the rise, and macroevolutionary scholars 
have most certainly contributed to their recognition by averring for a wider recog-
nition of the importance of development, biophysics, and ecology in providing a 
fuller view on the evolution of life.
These ideas find their origin in the period designated as the eclipse of 
Darwinism and associate with presynthetic ideas, and these ideas also form 
part of the credo of scholars who call out for an extended evolutionary syn-
thesis (Gontier 2010b; Pigliucci 2009; Pigliucci and Müller 2010). It is prob-
ably also the main reason why topics such as stasis and eco–evo–devo ranged 
so high at the 2009 Chicago bicentennial. As an audience participant, I found it 
nothing less than amazing how ideas associated with the “eclipse of Darwin,” 
characterized as heretic by the founders of the Synthesis, and first reintroduced 
from within macroevolutionary streams of thought were presented as basic sub-
ject areas of Neo-Darwinism and approached from within universal Darwinian 
(Dawkins 1983; Dennett 1995) and universal selectionist (Czicko 1995) 
accounts.
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3.2  Universalizing Punctuated Equilibria
The study of actual scientific practice teaches us that hypotheses and theories 
are tested for their use, not merely for their truth or corroboration to the truth, as 
Popper (1957) or logical empiricists assumed. Universal Darwinism and Universal 
Selection theory have proven to be useful to understand certain aspects of behav-
ior. Punctuated equilibria theory has equally proven its use by designating a shared 
theoretical framework by which we can understand the history and evolution of 
natural kinds such as species and higher taxa. It is safe to say that many of its 
claims, including that species, extinctions, speciation, stasis, and gaps are real, are 
not only accepted as part of scientific language, but they are intensely studied as 
phenomena in need of explanation by scholars on both micro- and macrosides.
Punctuated equilibria theory and macroevolutionary research in general, and 
cladistic analysis in particular, have furthermore provided a universal methodolog-
ical toolkit that is used to comprehend non-gradual vertical descent.
Just as the tenets of natural selection theory have been universalized across dis-
ciplinary boundaries and across the cosmic scale, so too the basic tenets of macro-
evolutionary outlooks in general and punctuated equilibria in particular have been 
universalized. Punctuated equilibria theory describes a pattern of evolution: Long 
periods of stasis are intermitted by short periods of rapid change (Eldredge and 
Gould 1972). Eldredge and Gould were among the first scholars within the field 
of paleontology to adopt cladistics which is an intrinsic genealogical method, and 
as such, they have been exemplar for macroevolutionary research of the living as 
well as the dead, both sub- and superorganically. Darwin argued that species share 
common genealogical descent, and as Eldredge rightfully notes, Hennig’s cladis-
tics method is the best scientific method available today to infer such genealogy or 
actual life history, because it is through such cladistic analysis that one can infer 
the patterns of evolution.
Cladistics, in keeping with the original search for natural kinds, but imbued with an evo-
lutionary perspective, boils down to a search for the actual distribution of the features, or 
‘characters’, of organisms. It turns out that such characters are complexly, hierarchically 
nested just as are the taxa they define. (Eldredge 1999: 70)
The major breakthrough cladistics has brought forth is that it enables to infer 
genealogies of the actual life history of populations and species. But one can just 
as well use them to study the actual genealogy or “half-life” of chemical sub-
stances such as proteins or genes, as well as particular morphological and behav-
ioral traits. These genealogies of natural kinds enable the building of phylogenetic 
taxonomies and hierarchies of the evolution of these specific phenomena. In short, 
traits can be morphological, but also genetic, behavioral, or cultural, and their ori-
gin, history, and ending can be mapped across time and space.
With the rise of whole-genome-sequencing techniques and our growing 
possibility to compute and study large data sets across time and space, fields 
such as meta- and comparative genomics are introducing macroevolutionary 
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reconstructions of various aspects of life’s history. The application of phylogenetic 
reconstruction methods that map the spread and distribution of genes has con-
firmed the pattern of punctuated equilibria in both extinct and extant taxa (Bokma 
2002; Bokma and Monroe 2010; Pagel et al. 2006; Venditti and Pagel 2008, 2010).
Historical linguists have from the nineteenth century onward and in close 
parallel with evolutionary biologists attempted to reconstruct the natural gene-
alogies of languages (Gontier 2011; Kressing et al. 2014). When Lorenz (1958) 
and Tinbergen (1963) first defined ethology, they wanted nothing less than to 
build a taxonomy of behavior and thus give the natural history or the genealogy 
of different behavioral traits by mapping when they first arose in time and how 
they evolved, spread, went extinct, or transitioned into something new. Equally, 
Nietzsche (1874) wanted nothing less than to launch the study of the genealogy of 
intellectual thought in our species, and when Campbell (1960, 1974) introduced 
the field of evolutionary epistemology, he wanted to map the evolution of knowl-
edge from bacteria to humans. These ideas are now finally entering the sociocul-
tural sciences. Today, anthropologists and archeologists are increasingly mapping 
the evolution of material culture by making use of phylogenetic and cladistics 
analyses. From within sub-branches of anthropology that are increasingly desig-
nated as macroarcheology and macroanthropology, scholars are reconstructing the 
beginning, evolution, and ending of “superorganic” traits across space and time.
Any and all such mappings by necessity take on a macroevolutionary approach, 
because we have to go beyond individual organisms, groups, and species, and 
focus on the genealogy or life history of the specific traits, i.e., genes, languages, 
or cultural artifacts themselves, beyond and across the beings that house them. 
And such research necessitates an investigation into their biogeography or how 
they populate the evolutionary landscape. Beyond gene pools, scholars are just 
beginning to map morphological, proteomic, viriomic, genetic, linguistic, and 
material culture pools. It are eventually such tree and network analyses that enable 
us to infer patterns of evolution, patterns that include stasis, branching, and merg-
ing. These patterns in turn give clues to the pace of evolution as well as the mecha-
nisms that underlie the natural history or evolution of these phenomena.
Today, phylogenetic methodologies are applied to model macroevolution-
ary, ancestral–descent relationships of our kind (Eldredge and Tattersall 1982; 
Schwartz and Tattersall 2001; Wood this volume) as well as the cultural historical 
dispersal of material artifacts (Currie et al. 2010; Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2006; 
Eldredge 2011; Eldredge and Tëmkin 2007; Lipo et al. 2006; O’Brien et al. 2002; 
Pagel and Meade 2006; Steele and Kandler 2010) and languages (Atkinson et al. 
2008; Mace and Jordan 2011; Pagel et al. 2007). These phylogenetic models pro-
vide rigorous evidence for the pattern of punctuated equilibria in strands of lin-
guistic and cultural evolution, as well as patterns of merging. Such research also 
necessitates new hierarchical thinking on cultural traits and behavioral phenom-
ena, how they relate to their inventors, and how they transcend them. In sum:
The macroevolutionary approach in archeology represents the most recent example in a 
long tradition of applying principles of biological evolution to the study of cultural change. 
Archeologists working within this paradigm see macroevolutionary theory as an effective 
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response to the shortcomings of Neo-Darwinian biological evolution for studying cultural 
evolution. Rather than operating at the level of individual traits, macroevolutionary arche-
ologists emphasize the role of hierarchical processes in cultural change. … Major cultural 
change, when it happens, is likely to be rapid, even revolutionary, with periods of rapid 
change separated by periods of relative stasis of actively maintained stability. (Zeder 2008: 1)
Concepts such as stasis, rapid turnovers, and constraints, or exaptations (Gould 
1991; Gould and Vrba 1982) that form part of the technical language introduced 
by macroevolutionary scholars are also applied on a metaphorical level in the soci-
ocultural sciences to describe certain aspects of linguistic and cultural evolution 
that cannot be accounted for by universal selectionism (d’Errico 2003; d’Errico 
and Stringer 2011; Tattersall 2014).
Universalizing punctuated equilibria, and thus developing a universal heuristic of 
the pattern, implies that we identify the mechanisms that underlie both the long periods 
of stasis and the short periods of rapid change. Several mechanisms can lead to sta-
sis, including overall developmental, genetic, or epigenetic constraints (Carroll 2005; 
Davidson and Erwin 2006; Futuyma 2005, 2010 this volume; Gehring 1999; Gould 
1977, 1989; Jablonka and Lamb 1995), stabilizing selection (Lieberman et al. 2005; 
Lieberman and Dudgeon 1996; Schmalhausen 1949) or drift (Bentley and O’Brien 
2011; Bentley et al. 2004; Eldredge et al. 2005; Hubbel 2001; Kimura 1968, 1983; 
Masel et al. 2007). Numerous mechanisms can explain rapid change or speciation, 
such as symbiogenesis (Margulis 1970, 1999; Gontier 2007, 2012b), hybridization 
(Arnold 2006, 2008), lateral gene transfer (Gogarten et al. 2009), and virolution (Ryan 
2006, 2009), the Baldwin effect (Baldwin 1896), or the Ratchet effect.
4  A Clash of Scientific Cultures
Natural selection is not the beginning, as a physical force that stands above and beyond 
time, it is the fallout, the record of history. (Eldredge 1998: 96)
In the 1980s, Maynard Smith (1983, 1984) invited paleontologists to join the high 
table of evolutionary theory. The invitation was followed by polemic debates in 
various articles and books. One of those responses came from Niles Eldredge in 
his book Reinventing Darwin: The Great Debate at the High Table of Evolutionary 
Theory. In it, he characterized John Maynard Smith, Richard Dawkins, and 
George Williams as ultra-Darwinists sitting at one side of the table, and on the 
opposite side, he positioned Stephen Jay Gould, Elisabeth Vrba, Stanley Salthe, 
and himself, whom he characterized as naturalists.
Ultra-Darwinists were those scholars who adhered to a microevolutionary per-
spective by reducing the theory of evolution by means of natural selection to the 
mechanical study of how genes underlie evolutionary change at a population level. 
In other words, they had taken genetic change at a population level as normative 
and causal for evolutionary change at all ranks of life. Naturalists, on the other 
hand, studied evolutionary history from within a macroevolutionary perspective 
and endorsed more holistic epistemic stances that included paleontological, bioge-
ographical, ecological, physical, and systematic areas of research. Their research 
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had been descriptive and had focused on finding recurring patterns and trends in 
various ranks of life that surpass the population level.
The problem for the naturalists was that the actual history of how life changes 
does not converge with the normative framework of how life should change. At the 
heart of the debate lie radically opposing views on how evolutionary research has 
to be conducted, and whose epistemic stance, the microreductionist or macrohol-
istic perspective was more scientific. While the ultra-Darwinists were concerned 
with detailing the underlying mechanism of evolution (which they associated 
exclusively with genetic selection), paleontologists were concerned with describ-
ing life’s history. In other words, it was a clash of scientific cultures where differ-
ent epistemic practices had evolved. Eldredge (1995: 2):
What is really at stake is diametrically opposed suppositions of how evolutionary biol-
ogy should be conducted. Maynard Smith put the geneticist’s position succinctly: pale-
ontology is about history. It is the paleontologist’s job to elucidate what the evolutionary 
process has wrought over the last 3.5 billion years. But evolutionary theory is about how 
the evolutionary process works. And that, to a geneticist, means how genetic information, 
underlying the production of the physical appearance (and physiologies and behaviors) 
or organisms, comes to be modified over the course of time. What can a paleontologist, 
trapped under the dead hand of history, possibly have to say about the mechanics of 
genetic change? After all, science is supposed to concern itself with how things work.
Eldredge (1995: 5) blamed ultra-Darwinists a form of “physics envy,” because 
“they seek to transform natural selection from a simple form of record-keeping, a 
filter that biases the distribution of genes between generations, to a more dynamic, 
active force that molds and shapes organic form as time goes by.” By wanting 
to turn natural selection into a constant physical force, they endorsed a form of 
“extrapolationism” because they assumed that evolution by means of natural selec-
tion was a steady-state, lawlike phenomenon where gradual changes in gene fre-
quencies suffice to explain evolution at all time and in all ranks of life. For the 
naturalists, the steady-state, lawlike theory of evolution by means of natural selec-
tion that had been developing did not converge with the actual history of life, and 
the geneticists’ point of view could not simply be extrapolated to large-scale sys-
tems defined as populations, species, and ecosystems.
But on the other side of the table (Dawkins 1982b, 1983; Maynard Smith 
1983), it was argued that natural history is merely descriptive and that an evolu-
tionary theory should aspire to transcend narration of singular, non-repetitive, and 
unobservable events, by finding the laws or mechanisms, the underlying causes 
that bring forth evolution. For ultra-Darwinists, natural history research or the nar-
ration of actual historical origination and extinction events, in and of itself, cannot 
explain the causes and effects of evolution.
4.1  Delineating the Scientific
These debates are not unique to evolutionary biology. All sciences at one point or 
another have developed debates about whether their science should be primarily 
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“descriptive” or “normative,” for example, as philosophers of science, in turn 
inspired by moral philosophers, call it. Inspired by de Saussure, linguists, anthro-
pologists, and sociologists, for example, know the debates as diachronic (histori-
cal and descriptive) over synchronic (structural and functional) research, and in 
physics, we find debates on Newtonian mechanics versus the new theoretical (bio)
physics associated with relativity theory, quantum mechanics, chaos theory, and 
thermodynamics. The reason these debates are similar is they share common intel-
lectual roots to which I turn in this section.
Should evolutionary science describe history or find its causes? And can sci-
ence tackle origin questions (or extinction questions for that matter) in a scientific 
manner, or should science reduce itself to the study of repeatable and observable 
events? These questions associate with five basic and inter-related problems.
1. The problem of causality: Should science be historical and observational and 
perform a kind of record-keeping, or instead be aetiological, and focus on find-
ing the underlying causes, the reasons why things are the way they are? The 
ultimate question here is: Can we go beyond record-keeping and find constancy 
in underlying mechanisms?
2. The problem of predictability: Should science explain what is (either mechani-
cally or historically), or should it be able to explain what ought to be? In other 
words, can science make predictions on the future and inferences from the 
past?
3. The problem of uniformity or constancy over time: Does observation enable 
prediction and inferences on causality? Does what happens in the present 
immediately set the norm for the past as well as the future?
4. The problem of determinism or relativity: Is the universe determined by 
fixed laws, or is evolutionary change relative and dependable upon changing 
variables?
5. The problem of knowing: Can we, human observers and theoreticians, come to 
everlasting and objective truths, or merely develop temporary, local knowledge 
perspectives, from within a variety of epistemic stances?
The problems are indeed interrelated, because mechanisms can only be invoked 
when change, and that what causes it, is constant through time, or, in other words, 
determined by everlasting and unchanging laws. Predictability also depends upon 
the constancy of the mechanism over time. Favoring a normative view therefore 
implies a uniformitarian epistemic stance.
So a connection has to be forged between uniformitarianism, gradualism, and reduction-
ism: extrapolationism, the projection of commonly observed rates and processes as a pre-
diction of what history ought to look like. (Eldredge 1999: 40)
In 1965, Gould wrote a paper titled Is uniformitarian necessary? wherein he dis-
tinguished between two types of uniformitarianism: substantive uniformitarian-
ism that endorses “uniformity of rates of geological change” and methodological 
uniformitarianism that assumes “time and space invariance of natural laws.” The 
pattern of punctuated equilibria proves that substantive uniformitarianism is false, 
and according to Gould (1965), methodological uniformitarianism, which assumes 
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constancy of natural laws, is obsolete, most of all because laws are interspersed 
by other, often random events that function as disturbances to these laws. In other 
words, catastrophism, or the acceptance that abiotic random events such as meteor 
impacts can influence extinction and the future course of evolution of remaining 
life (e.g., Alverez et al. 1980), is valid.
Both Eldredge (1985b) and Gould (1987) spent a significant amount of their 
career fleshing out the origin of uniformitarian views and the notions on time that 
it brings forth. Uniformitarianism was introduced by Hutton, popularized by Lyell 
(1830, 1832, 1833), and endorsed by Whewell (1833). Uniformitarianists assume 
that adequate observational knowledge of the present should suffice to induc-
tively infer the past and predict the future. But, these early scholars did so because 
they endorsed a lawlike physical view of nature in line with Newtonian mechan-
ics that was inspired by Cartesian philosophy, where space, matter, and therefore 
also time are absolute and thus a priori determined, linear, constant, and irrevers-
ible. Such a stance enables uniformity and predictability toward the past as well as 
the future because laws are real, steady, and constant. These scholars started from 
the assumption that the universe, its laws, and our knowledge of them were the 
result of a benign God. As such, scientists became objective viewers that transcend 
nature and take on a God’s-eye view (Pinxten 1997). This brings us right back to 
cosmology or better yet, the transition from studies on cosmogony (the origin of 
the cosmos) to cosmology (the scientific study of its underlying causes, or aitia).
Newtonian physics is best known among philosophers and physicists for 
validating only Aristotle’s causa efficiens which associates with the how ques-
tion: how does matter move and how do phenomena function? It calls out for a 
mechanical approach, but it nonetheless assumes perfect, eternal, and harmonious 
functionality in the best of all possible worlds. In short, all these scholars, as firm 
believers of Judeo-Christian genesis so beautifully depicted in the scala naturae 
of their time, assumed that the cosmos followed perfect and constant, clocklike 
mechanical laws because they were, in deistic worldviews, the “hand of God” so 
to say. God did not have to intervene, like was the case in theistic worldviews, 
because nature follows predictable and teleological perfection.
Such views no longer form part of our worldview. As Eldredge put it:
Most laws are descriptions of what happens given the existence of a set of conditions. 
Thus, while we might tend to think of gravity as some sort of process (gravity is one 
of the four basic ‘forces’ physicists investigate), Newton’s and all subsequent ‘laws’ of 
gravity are simply generalizations about just what will happen given the existence of two 
hunks of matter of specified mass and distance apart. (Eldredge 1985b: 174)
With the rise of relativity theory, quantum mechanics, and chaos theory, we are 
necessitated to acknowledge that our cosmologies or epistemic frameworks are 
bounded by observational stances and probabilistic analyses, as well as colored by 
our cultural and theoretical frameworks. In our cosmologies, there is no God’s-eye 
view, and there are no reifiable constant physical forces, or if there are, we do not 
know them. The best we can do is define the conditions of change of current and 
past events, generalize from there, and compare the generalizations, which brings 
forth a statistical analysis.
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Philosophers and scientists alike are fond of the idea that an evolutionary theory 
 pertaining to any sort of system is unlikely to be established without a convincing 
mechanism, a well-articulated and corroborated process of change. … Darwin is still 
commonly supposed to have succeeded where all others before him had failed in estab-
lishing the credibility of evolution because he supplied a process that could plausibly 
account for the history of life: natural selection. … the contention involves whether pat-
tern is preeminent over process in establishing credibility of an evolutionary theory.’ 
(Eldredge 1998: 98)
The naturalists, mostly because of the importance they give to biophysics (Bohm 
1980; Kauffman 1995; Prigogine 1980; Stanley this volume), have made the cosmo-
logical transition from a teleological to a relativist worldview and have allowed it to 
enter evolutionary science, while microevolutionary scholars endorse a more ambiv-
alent view that tries to fit the old cosmologies into the new. I give two examples to 
explain this transition: the rise of natural history research and the clock metaphor.
Evolutionary science is an outgrowth of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
research on the natural history of the cosmos. Advances in physics had caused for 
a transition from a geocentric to a heliocentric worldview, which in turn had raised 
doubts about the divine order of the world which scholars had for centuries been 
depicting in scala naturae where the earth was traditionally placed in the center of 
the universe. From the Renaissance onward and culminating in the Enlightenment, 
scholars sought out the natural history of the universe (for an overview, see Duhem 
1969, 1985).
Natural history research started in an age when travel stories of colonizers, 
gentleman scientists, and missionaries reported on foreign cultures, languages, 
political systems, and fauna and flora; when historical linguists were mapping the 
natural genealogies of the world’s languages; when anthropologists avant la let-
tre were providing the first narrations of foreign cultures; and when moral phi-
losophers such as Hobbes, Rousseau, Hume, Smith, and Mill debated the natural 
as opposed to divine condition of man as well as the status of “common goods,” 
in “primordial” (which they associated with non-Western) as well as sociopoliti-
cal societies. In short, natural history research was characterized by encompassing 
attempts to narrate the natural history of the world and everything in it by referring 
to its natural “generation” or “development” in opposition to its divine origin.
The term evolution comes from the Latin noun ēvolūtio- (the act of reading, or 
unrolling a script, or narrating a history) and the verb ēvolvo- (ex—out of and volvo-—
roll) and denotes development or unfolding. In this context, it was used in teleo-
logical, preformationist circles where especially medics and to some extent natural 
history students studied the growth of organismal form by trying to narrate its histori-
cal development through time. But it was equally used in this context, by cultural and 
linguistic scientists such as Auguste Schleicher or Max Müller; sociopolitical scien-
tists such Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, or Kropotkin; philoso-
phers of history such as Hegel, Herder, and Nietzsche; or geologists such as Hutton, 
Lyell, or Bronn. In these circles, the study of the development of natural beings (lan-
guages, cultures, societies, political structures, or biological species) was therefore, 
more than anything, the study of natural, chronological sequences of change that 
beings go through, or stated differently, it is the study of historical change through 
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time. From within the major languages used to develop the scientific worldview, i.e., 
ancient Greek, neo-Latin, English, German, and French, scholars first used terms 
such as “development,” “entwicklung,” and “dévelopmement,” to refer to processes 
of historical change of sociopolitical, biological, or earthly form through time, and 
this development eventually became denoted as evolution.
These investigations into the natural history of the earth and its inhabitants 
raised doubts on the age of the globe, the fixity of natural kinds (languages, cul-
tures, societies, and species), and whether or not we live in the best of all possible 
worlds. In sum, it questioned the traditional assumptions there existed on matter, 
space, and time. In particular, the latter gave way to two types of “conservation eth-
ics”: musealisierung, the nineteenth century is typified by the rise of the great natu-
ral history museums of France, London, Vienna, Brussels, and New York (see, e.g., 
Lübbe 1990); and patriotism and nationalism, the encounter of “the other” made 
especially European scholars emphasize and favor their own natural history. In 
particular in Prussia, works by Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Herder, and eventually Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Heidegger would take on the question of time in relation to history.
Before, the act of conducting historical research involved a narration of past 
events, and such narration was often biased toward Western history and cosmol-
ogy. But the natural history students went further and wanted to find the patterns 
and deeper lying meaning of historical change as well as the ultimate nature of 
time. In short, they wanted to “scientify” history, which they did by postulating 
equally biased developmental and vitalist laws of generation and decay so typical 
of the nineteenth century. They understood time as directional. More specifically, 
time was directed toward a given end state, and development was understood as 
progression toward that end state. Such a view entails a continuation of teleologi-
cal thinking.
Comte and Spencer, for example, assumed a steady progress from nomad to 
shepherd to industrialized and civilized man. Their analyses of time were inspired 
by religious and philosophical ideas on the world’s beginning, duration, and escha-
tological ending. By adhering to a non-cyclical, linear, and teleological worldview, 
they assumed that form necessarily develops according to a given and fixed plan, if 
not of divine origin then through natural cause by means of natural (physical and 
developmental) laws. Social Darwinists eventually understood natural selection, 
interpreted as the survival of the fittest, as one such law. Natural history research 
induced a first attempt to find a deeper and higher pattern or order in history which 
brought forth the stadial, unilineal, orthogenic, and racial theories that eventually 
became used and abused to justify racism, imperialism, and hegemony, as well as 
the two world wars.
This type of historical research is today called historicism (Popper 1957), 
and after the havoc it had caused in the wars, and for good reason, such research 
became condemned. Instead of “morphologically” comparing cultures and plac-
ing them on a developmental scale, sociocultural and linguistic scientists averred 
for historical particularism and the incommensurability of cultures and languages, 
which brought forth synchronic instead of diachronic investigations. This means 
that comparative research became redefined, not as a historical discipline, but as a 
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functionalist/structuralist discipline where cultural and linguistic “universals” are 
examined in their particular form in the variety of cultures, languages, and soci-
etal structures that exist. de Saussure (2006) in linguistics, Malinowski (1944) in 
anthropology, and Durkheim (1895) or Talcott Parsons (1975) in sociology averred 
for a synchronization of the sociocultural sciences where the organic and develop-
ing natural kinds of before became reinterpreted as closed systems underlain by 
functional operationalist, universal and determining dead structures that, in their 
operations, work similar to natural clocks and in accordance with steady laws. In 
philosophy, science was equally argued to progress and advance toward the truth, 
which is why they assumed that older theoretical frameworks could be reformu-
lated in “more advanced,” later-developed scientific frameworks through “bridge 
laws” that enable a harmonious synchronization of human thought toward knowl-
edge. Such “synchronization” also entered the biological sciences, where mechan-
ical, functionalist, and structuralist explanations of underlying causes became 
favored over historical narrations.
When the early natural history and evolutionary scholars were developing their 
ideas, they neither foresaw nor planned the havoc it would bring forth. It would 
be foolish to think that the terrors of colonialism and the world wars were brought 
forth by such research instead of economic, political, and religious reasons. 
Nonetheless, it would be equally foolish to deny that it contributed to the general 
Zeitgeist of the time and served as a justification for the crimes against humanity. 
We, who know the consequences of the early attempts to scientify the study of 
natural history, therefore have an obligation to investigate and try to understand 
what could have caused this early historical research to have gone so wrong. One 
of the reasons why historical research in the nineteenth century was typified by 
orthogenic views is that they lacked an evolutionary concept of time and instead 
continued to adhere to a teleological notion of time. Time is absolute, irreversi-
ble, lineal, progressive, and directed toward a final goal. And the reason matter 
attained its goal was because it was subjected to natural laws that gave directional-
ity toward the end state. Eternal forces actualize inherent potential. That is why 
the missionaries, for example, did what they did. They assumed a favored position 
by claiming to have insight into the eschatological end state of the universe, and 
the “civilization” of “barbaric men,” for them, was an act of charity wherein they 
helped actualize the potential of “underdeveloped” cultures.
To make this point more explicit, let us look into the second example, the meta-
phor of a clock. Hume (1739) really did hit the sore spot by treating matters of 
morality and matters of causality in the same way because both go from what is 
to what ought to be. We have seen the sun come up today, yesterday, and all the 
days of our lives as far as we can remember. Our ancestors who lived before us 
also saw the sun coming up on a daily basis, and we have scientific evidence that 
she did so from the moment earth was formed and started its orbit around it. We 
have good scientific theories today that explain why we perceive the sun as com-
ing up and going down, and these theories predict that the orbits of the earth and 
sun will undergo no significant change for many ages to come. But in the end, 
the prediction that the sun will come up tomorrow is not 100 % guaranteed, and 
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however probable the prediction is today, based upon the parameters available 
to us, it is our expectation that she will. And that expectation in the end is based 
upon uniformitarian, teleological, and clockwork notions of the universe. Hume on 
the other hand explained all predictions as well as moral prescriptions as human 
expectations and considered them the dominion of what we today call psychology.
Throughout the years, the problem has only intensified. The logical positivists 
held firm beliefs that our languages, be they expressed in logic, mathematics, or 
natural language, somehow relate to the world and that theories can be bridged 
because they are commensurable just because science progresses toward the truth. 
Wittgenstein provided proof based upon logic that we cannot demonstrate that lan-
guage, mathematics included, refers to the world. Moreover, even if we did pos-
sess the perfect language to explain the state of affairs of the world, the mere fact 
of endorsing an evolutionary worldview necessitates that whatever we are able to 
predict today will only happen if the world does not change and if the parameters 
we define in our scientific language as valid and foundational remain so and thus 
do not alter at a different moment in time.
Western science had grown from assumptions that humans lived in a perfect 
world, that filled an absolute space, with an absolute and irreversible time, and 
humans were considered to have insight into the perfect mechanisms of the world, 
which they described in a perfect language that they had received from a perfect 
God. The age of the Renaissance and the age of Enlightenment were a celebration 
of this human capacity, a capacity that enabled to take on a “God’s-eye view,” and 
to become humanistic gods themselves, that know right from wrong, truth from 
falsehood, and future from the past.
Descartes, a firm believer, introduced mechanical thinking within the field of epis-
temology, and he was the first to introduce the idea that the natural world functions 
as a clock. He inspired Newton who inspired Paley, who inspired Dawkins, in think-
ing that we live in the best of all possible worlds because mechanical laws lead to an 
optimal and balanced cosmos. The clock metaphor is an argument for design that is 
based upon teleological arguments. In line with his mind–body distinction, Descartes 
fought animism by arguing that anatomically, organisms function perfectly according 
to physiological mechanisms that make their organs function as parts of a harmo-
nious clock of which the sum of the parts defines the whole. The mechanical laws 
according to which they function so adequately for Descartes proved the existence 
of God. Paley, as an ardent adherent of intelligent design avant la lettre, would build 
upon these ideas, and this argument for optimalization is exactly what we find in 
Dawkins’ (1995) work, who characterizes natural selection as a “blind watchmaker.” 
Inspired by Fisher and the “hill-climbing metaphor” used to describe Sewall Wright's 
landscapes, and by introducing the idea of “accumulative selection,” he has always 
had an ambiguity in what regards the predictive powers of selection:
The theory of natural selection provides a mechanistic, causal account of how living 
things came to look as if they had been designed for a purpose. So overwhelming is the 
appearance of purposeful design that, […] we still find it difficult indeed boringly pedan-
tic, to refrain from teleological language when discussing adaptation. Bird’s wings are 
obviously ‘for’ flying, […]. (Dawkins 1982a: 161)
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For Newton, time and space were absolute and irreversible, and truth was  conceived 
to be singluar. William Whewell, another firm believer, attacked the standard histor-
ical thinking of his time that was characterized by narration and instead reinstated 
aetiology, the Greek study of causes. Whewell endorsed that inductive research ena-
bles generalizations on these causes. But he could only do so by accepting Hutton’s 
and Lyell’s principle of uniformity which is a direct consequence of living in a 
Newtonian steady-state universe where it finds its justification. In such a world, you 
have steady cause and steady effect, under all circumstances according to the same 
final or unchanging teleological forces. Empiricism might be observation based, it 
no less assumes, just like rationalist deductionism, that laws are constant. In fact, that 
was the main contribution scholars like Lyell and Whewell advanced: Insight into 
eternal laws comes from observation, not inborn categories of the mind. As Gould 
(2002: 102) put it:
History presents two special problems: (1) frequent absence of evidence, given imperfec-
tions of preservation; and (2) uniqueness of sequences, unrepeatable in theory contingent 
complexity, and thereby distancing the data of history from such standard concepts as pre-
diction, and experimentalization. We may epitomize the dilemma in the following way: 
many people define science as the study of causal processes. Past processes are, in princi-
ple, unobservable. We must therefore work by inference from results preserved in the his-
torical record. We must study modern results produced by processes that can be directly 
observed and even manipulated by experiment – and we must then infer the causes of past 
results by their “sufficient similarity” … which presents results. This procedure requires, 
as Mill … and other philosophers recognized long ago, a methodological assumption of 
temporal invariance for laws of nature.
When Mayr (1961) was creating a discipline for evolutionary biology, he found 
himself troubled by cause and effect in biology. Ever since Newton, only the how 
question, the question about mechanism, was considered science. Aristotle’s what 
and what for questions were abandoned because they introduce teleology, and 
that is exactly what the organizers of the Darwin centennial and microevolution-
ary biologists were reintroducing. Ernest Nagel, a logical positivist (one of those 
who believed we possess the perfect logical scientific language) and philosopher 
of physics, was a firm believer in reductionism and singular truth. Mayr was hesi-
tant in adopting a genetic reductionist stance and argued instead for the unity of 
the genotype and phenotype. He distinguished between functional/operational 
(synchronic) and evolutionary (diachronic) biologists. The first study operational 
clocks (the physiology of organisms or “programs guaranteeing behavior that 
increases fitness”), and the latter, instead of asking “what for,” ask “how come” 
which is a question directed toward the past that requires historical analysis (for a 
more elaborate discussion, see Gontier 2012a).
As such, Mayr revived the study of natural history and found a scientific way 
to get rid of the teleology. He validated the fact that biologists cannot and in 
fact need not make predictions about the future, in the same way physicists do. 
Because biology is a study of evolutionary history, it is directed toward the past, 
because it explains the present in a historical, sequential manner. Evolutionary 
biology is not a science that needs to predict the future, because the future of 
biological life is itself unpredictable. Mayr did excellent work in delineating 
260 N. Gontier
biology as a scientific field in and of itself, a discipline that stands on its own 
two feet where physical laws cannot simply be bridged into evolutionary ones. 
Natural selection is a mechanism, not because it explains the future, but because 
it explains the past. Mayr never endorsed either teleology or teleonomy. Similar 
discussions were also held between biophysicists and classic physicists, in what 
regards the second law of thermodynamics, but these go beyond the scope of the 
present paper. For a good analysis, I refer the reader to the 1995 special issue in 
Physicalia Magazine, where Bricmont (1995) and Prigogine debated the problems 
of predictability in relation to matters of indeterminacy as brought forth by chaos 
theory (also in relation to the Sokal–Bricmont affair).
Returning to Eldredge’ naturalists, these scholars conceive the clock to be more 
crooked. Lewontin (2000: 81), for example, in responding to Dawkins, said:
In biology, this “what for” question is not the same as it is in the analysis of the parts of 
a motorcar or a clock. […] In the case of the organism there are, of course, general func-
tions such as motion, respiration and reproduction that are common, but there are many 
particular functions, peculiar to different life forms, that cannot be known in advance. In 
addition it is by no means true that every part serves a function. Many features of organ-
isms are the epiphenomenal consequences of developmental changes or the functionless 
leftovers from remote ancestors.
We can easily see that it is a clash of epistemic cultures, one inspired by the old 
and one by the new. In particular, Lewontin’s latter argument also makes implicit 
reference to Gould and Vrba’s (1982) notion of exaptations, which is another 
means by which uniformitarianism can be fought. Naturalists take on a more rela-
tivistic view. In both science and philosophy, relativism carries bad connotations 
because “anything goes,” but that need not be the case. What a relativist stance 
does most is mark a transition from epistemic monism toward epistemic plural-
ism. Stated differently, it rejects the notion of a single universe and a single truth, 
in favor of multiple explanations, and in the most fascinating scenario, it accepts 
ontological pluralism. What does that mean?
Fill a glass up to its exact middle. That glass is either half-full or half-empty. 
If you call it half-full, you might be an optimist, and if you call it half-empty, that 
might indicate you are a pessimist. Reality is that the glass is both half-full and 
half-empty, and whatever stance you prefer, it eventually lies in the eye of the 
beholder. Quantum mechanics has taught us the exact same thing in what regards 
waves and particles. And the micro–macroevolutionary debate has done the same 
for the study of the evolution of life; one can explain life by its genes, or by its 
natural history. It demonstrates first and foremost that a particular frame of refer-
ence underlies any and all scientific observation as well as theory formation, and 
that frame of reference is brought forth by either instruments or human observ-
ers and therefore also partially bounded by both. Science is human, and in reality, 
truth need not be singular for the glass is both half-full and half-empty.
We no longer live in a Newtonian world where space is absolute, time is irre-
versible, everything works in the form of a mechanical clock, and observers take 
on a God’s-eye view to deduce the everlasting truths about the universe. All we 
have are our frames of reference, and these immediately call out for epistemic 
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pluralism. We can scientifically justify a microstance as well as a macrostance, 
there is scientific proof for both, and we can compare both to one another and 
incorporate them into yet another framework. But we cannot transcend these 
frameworks. All we can do is develop as many frames of reference as possible. 
The latter entails a reconstruction of biorealities, work that was first taken on by 
the early natural history scholars and that today is well on its way to define actual 
scientific practices. I return to this latter point in the following section.
Simpson (1944), for example, when introducing the macroperspective in pale-
ontology, was most of all thinking through the consequences that thermodynam-
ics, relativity theory, and quantum physics have on our notions of evolution. Such 
branches of physics necessitate more pragmatic and operational, instrumental defi-
nitions of causality as well as science, which becomes understood as a practical 
and instrumental attempt to infer the conditions of change. Pragmatism and instru-
mentalism (other words used to denote relativism) were first introduced by scholars 
such as James (1907, 1909) and Duhem (1954). Teggart (1916, 1925), who inspired 
Eldredge in both his definition of punctuated equilibria and the epistemic stance it 
necessitates, was very much inspired by these scholars when he wrote that:
‘As the sciences have developed,’ William James says, ‘the notion has gained ground that 
most, perhaps all, of our laws are only approximations.’ ‘Investigators have become accus-
tomed to the notion that no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any of them 
may from some point of view be useful. Their great use is to summarize facts and to lead 
to new ones.’ Obviously, then, it is not the function of science to gratify the desire of men 
to certainty. No scientific ‘law’ is to be regarded otherwise than as a ‘working hypoth-
esis’ which has proved of value in organizing some phase of experience. ‘The conception,’ 
Bertrand Russell says, ‘of the ‘working hypothesis’, provisional, approximate, and merely 
useful, has more and more pushed aside the comfortable eighteenth century conception of 
‘law of nature’. (Teggart 1925: 163)
Take something as simple as the syllogism, if A then B, so if you have A, then it is 
B, at all times and everywhere. It forms the core of cause and effect in Aristotle as 
well as Newton’s world, but it is not part of ours. If the evolutionary sciences have 
taught us anything, it is that if A, that A sometimes evolves by means of natural 
selection, sometimes by drift, sometimes by symbiogenesis, sometimes by lateral 
gene transfer, sometimes due to external events in the abiotic world, sometimes 
just not at all, and most of the time through a combination of all the previous at 
different levels of an all but perfect agglomeration we humans call “organism.” 
The point is that how evolution occurs is conditional upon the parameters, and 
these are not stable. Another way of saying this is that it is a logical necessity, 
within an evolutionary worldview, to assume that the means by which change 
occurs themselves are variable through time, and what caused evolution in the past 
might neither set the conditions for the present, nor for the future. The direction-
ality we sometimes find in life is there because of historical reasons and might 
change in the future. It all depends upon the stability of the initial conditions, 
which themselves change in an evolving world.
Such a view does not at all call out for the end of science because “anything 
goes,” and it merely marks the beginning of a new epistemic stance, one that 
is characterized by epistemic plurality and the reconstruction of biorealities: 
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epistemic referential frameworks of life that describes the genealogy of natural 
kinds, biological individuals. And these genealogies lend insight into the underly-
ing mechanisms or heuristics, i.e., the specific conditions through which phenom-
ena originate, change, and end.
Both the micro- and macroperspectives have, from within their own set of ref-
erences, created new and inspiring referential frameworks, evolution according to 
genes, evolution according to environmental conditions. Others have developed 
evolutionary views according to lateral gene transfer, symbiogenesis, drift, phys-
ics, etc. The frameworks enable us to compare and as such approximate or corrob-
orate not one but multiple biological realities and provide a fuller understanding of 
just how it is that evolution comes about. And such work, most of all, is brought 
about through reconstructions of natural history.
It is no coincidence that both the micro- and macroperspectives reintroduce a 
notion of organicism, by revitalizing the dead and investigating their natural his-
tory, according to genetic shifts in populations over time, or according to external 
factors that define the conditions of change. It is a return to the natural history 
scholars’ epistemic framework, something which can only be celebrated.
5  Conclusion: Reintegrating History by Reconstructing 
Biorealities of the Dead
Patterns in the history of life have been suggesting for at least a half century that there are 
regularly occurring sets of conditions that seem to control evolutionary activity – dampen-
ing it, often for longer periods, and triggering often rapid evolution at other times. Like 
ecological succession, evolution produces, not isolated events, but repeated pattern which 
hold clues to how the process works – specifically, how the physical world of matter-in-
motion impacts the biological realm. (Eldredge 1998: 5)
What was the eclipse of Darwinism, really? Why it was one of the most illumi-
nating periods in the reconstruction of the natural history of life. It marks a time 
that coincides with the introduction of the genies: morphogenesis, ontogenesis, 
phylogenesis, monogenesis, polygenesis, heterogenesis, embryogenesis, epigen-
esis, spermatogenesis, somitogenesis, symbiogenesis, psychogenesis, anthropo-
genesis, biogenesis, abiogenesis, and so on. Any and all terms defined new fields 
that set out to narrate the natural history of various aspects of life, by giving the 
natural genealogy of the parts that make up the wholes and by reconstructing 
their generation and decay through space and time. But, alas, without cladistics at 
their disposal, and still too much inspired by their teleological worldviews, most 
of the researchers, with a fair exception of the symbiologists, endorsed a form of 
orthogenesis, a straight-line evolution toward a predefined end state. There is no 
scientific proof for any of the orthogenic claims that were ever made, and with 
the foundation of the Modern Synthesis, the genies turned into logies where nat-
ural selection was the underlying mechanism that was assumed to explain all. 
Subsequently, synchronization followed.
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Nonetheless, studies on the natural history of life remained an activity performed 
either in the margins or outside the Modern Synthesis. Scholars who studied symbio-
sis were one of the first to accept life’s multilinearity and multidimensionality. The 
theory of symbiogenesis, a term first coined by Merzhkowsky (1905, 1910), from 
its onset, has explained how multicellular life historically evolved through symbi-
otic mergings and has rejected a single common origin from its very beginning. Such 
symbiotic mergings, in a very real sense, entail a form of time travel, where the old 
can merge into the new, but the new can equally merge with the old. Reticulate evo-
lution brings forth multidirectionality and multidimensionality, concepts that also 
formed the hallmark of neo-Lamarckianism, and it defines studies on cytology, where 
scholars investigate the actual processes that occur in cellular life; ecology, which 
studies the natural and actual organism–organism and organism–environmental inter-
actions; embryology, which studies the actual developments of organisms; and pale-
ontology, which studies the actual natural history of species and higher taxa. All these 
fields are first and foremost historically and data driven rather than theory-driven 
sciences. Their scholars aim to explain real-life events and at present that implies a 
narration of past events much more so than it provides explanatory frameworks that 
point out their constant underlying conditions of change. Nonetheless, the patterns 
such researchers found can be applied and generalized outside their context of dis-
covery. Symbiogenesis, for example, is not a unique event in the history of eukary-
otic cells, it is a repeated mechanism whereby multiple life forms speciate (Brucker 
and Bordenstein 2013; Carrapiço and Rodrigues 2005; Carrapiço forthcoming; 
Gontier 2015). Scholars that associate with these fields are therefore increasingly 
calling out for a revision of the Modern Synthesis because their facts do not add up 
with the theorized claims of how life should evolve, while they can explain many 
real-life evolutionary events.
In contrast, the Modern Synthesis developed because of mathematical gen-
eralizations of theoretical rather than actual population genetics and how they 
behave in imaginary adaptive landscapes. Mathematics is also what enabled 
Neo-Darwinians to generalize and “universalize” natural selection theory to all 
domains of life, where prisoner dilemmas and other mathematical models enable 
theoretical scholars to model the evolution of life without so much as looking at its 
actual history. We must not forget that the Modern Synthesis itself was formulated 
before the genetic code was deciphered and before scholars could actually “see” 
or cladistically map the chemical structures and compounds that make up cells, 
organisms, and populations.
Either fields such as exobiology, cytology, epigenetics, paleontology, ecol-
ogy, and embryology were excluded from the general framework of the Modern 
Synthesis, or their theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence only accumu-
lated after the Modern Synthesis was formed. What unites all these diverse fields 
is that they have developed diverse techniques to enable better insight into the 
actual natural history that life has undergone and the various paths it has chosen. 
Large genome-sequencing techniques, proteomics, the viriome, the microbiome, 
metabolic pathways, behavior, and material culture, today, are studied phylogenet-
ically, by mapping their actual historical and geographical dispersals across space 
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and time. Equally, in fields such as biophysics, scholars are just beginning to map 
the natural history of the earth, by documenting the genealogy, the beginning, “life 
span,” and ending of chemical cycles such as the nitrogen and water cycle (Volk 
1995, 1998). Doolittle (1999, 2010) together with Dawkins one of the most fierce 
opponents of the Gaia hypothesis—that views our planet as a living organism with 
a beginning, life span, and ending in time—is now actively engaged in recon-
structing actual cell histories by understanding them as biological individuals. The 
work indeed is noble, but it nonetheless makes use of the same kind of reasoning 
that scholars such as Margulis and Lovelock (1974) used when they understood 
earth as a natural being.
We currently find ourselves in the midst of a return to natural history, and we 
have finally found the instrumental tools that enable to reconstruct the evolution-
ary lineages of the dead. These reconstructions together shed new light on the evo-
lution of the living. By decomposing the living into various sub- and superunits, 
and investigating the individual history of each and every one of them indepen-
dently, we have reached an age of epistemic plurality (Gontier 2010a). We can 
describe organisms based upon the evolution of their genes, their microbiome, 
their viriome, their morpho- or embryogenesis, etc. And together, that brings forth 
a better understanding of various and distinct biorealities.
Scholars associated with the extended synthesis are today proving that besides 
natural selection, the conditions of change that define other evolutionary mecha-
nisms can also be generalized toward other domains of life and applied beyond 
their original context of discovery. It is hard to think about evolutionary patterns 
without the mechanisms, the conditions of change, by which they are brought 
forth. Natural selection was mainly defined through the study of eukaryotic ani-
mal lineages and first focused on extant species in their natural habitat as well as 
extinct species as they present themselves in the fossil record. Today, when pos-
sible, comparative genetic research (as opposed to morphometric comparisons) 
lends insight into the exact ancestral–descendant relationships of animals in deep 
time, and as described above, natural selection has been “universalized” to non-
biological domains of life. Drift was first defined based upon research on the 
existence of neutral organismal traits (Darwin 1959). Later, it became defined in 
theoretical terms as a statistical property of theoretical population models, first at 
a molecular genetic level (Kimura 1968, 1976, 1983) and then at a species and 
above species as well as environmental level (Hubbel 2001). The mechanisms 
of hybridization (Arnold 2006) (divergence with gene flow or introgression) 
were mostly obtained from the study of plants and, albeit to a lesser extent, ani-
mals. Symbiogenesis (Wallin 1927; Kozo-Polyanski 1924; Margulis 1970, 1981) 
became defined based upon the study of organismal, symbiotic interactions as well 
as investigations into the evolutionary origins of the various organelles present 
in the eukaryotic cell. The mechanisms that underlie lateral gene transfer (trans-
formation, transduction, conjugation) were first obtained from studies into how 
prokaryotes, viruses, protozoa, and fungi underlie infection and disease in organ-
isms (Avery et al. 1944; Lederberg and Tatum 1946; Morse et al. 1956). Today, 
genealogical research enables generalizations of the underlying mechanisms to 
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all domains of life, because whole-genome analyses enable scholars to calculate 
the exact amounts of species-specific and alien (acquired) genes (Doolittle 1999, 
2010; Woese 1998). Both epigenetics and evo–devo investigate how evolution can 
be informed by specific post-genetic (e.g., post-translational changes in protein 
structures) and more general ontogenetically acquired characteristics (Jablonka 
and Lamb 1989).
The history of life is characterized by repeating patterns and trends. 
Evolutionary patterns are hard to describe without making reference to evolution-
ary theories that identify the pattern and seek out to explain the likelihoods or 
necessities by which it occurs. We are still very much in the dark about those con-
ditions, but scholars have made good progress in what regards recurring patterns.
Evolution appears to move across a horizontal, a vertical, and a reticulate axis. 
Not all life forms remain extant, and whole types and all individuals go extinct. 
Not all life forms remain constant. That is as basic as it gets. To give more pat-
terns, we need to refer to evolutionary theories such as natural selection, symbio-
genesis, and lateral gene transfer.
Conditions of change are by and large defined in terms of internal and exter-
nal, biotic and abiotic, and organismal and environmental parameters. The prin-
ciples of conditional change are defined in terms of evolutionary mechanisms. 
Evolutionary mechanisms in turn are theoretical generalizations, working hypoth-
esis on the natural history of various life strands through time. In other words, 
they are generalizations of how conditional change appears to have occurred in the 
past, and they can be tested for how well they are generalizable toward other phe-
nomena beyond their context of discovery.
Evolution by drift, for example, gives a random or non-directional pattern. The 
outcome of natural selection is vertical descent with modification, and the emerg-
ing pattern can be either unilineal or bifurcating. Symbiogenesis or LGT gives 
reticulate, multidirectional patterns of horizontal mergings.
Based upon how widespread and persistent the evolutionary mechanism is across 
lineages, the emerging pattern can be argued to be stable if not permanent in time. 
Selection will always lead to diversification, drift will always be random, and sym-
biogenesis or reticulate evolution in general will always involve mergings. If either 
pattern seizes to emerge in time, the mechanism seizes to be active, or better yet, the 
conditions for that particular kind of change are not met. Patterns are thus causally 
explained by referring to postulated parameters that define conditional change. And 
that is eventually what an evolutionary mechanism is, it is not a constant force.
Moreover, these reconstructions again necessitate us to acknowledge that truth 
need not be singular. At one point in time, eukaryotes evolved according to sym-
biogenesis, at another point in time, they did so by means of natural selection, and 
at yet another period in time, they evolved by drift. Most of the time, they do not 
evolve at all, and when they do, they evolve by a combination of these means, sim-
ply because the organisms themselves are compositional structures. As such, we 
also need to investigate whether there is some higher-order sorting of mechanisms, 
and what would define the parameters of such sorting.
Evolutionary mechanisms are theoretical frameworks that define the parame-
ters and conditions of change under well-defined circumstances. Genes evolve by 
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means of natural selection if certain conditions are met, and symbiogenesis and 
drift equally occurs when certain well-defined conditions are met. When these 
conditions are not met, life does not evolve according to that pattern. What we 
need to do is find the conditions of change.
Evolution is spontaneous, random, and selective, and species come into being 
through splitting and merging, which can occur slow or fast. We can use a lot of 
fancy words to say things differently, but that is basically it. These are the heuris-
tics or working hypotheses scholars have been working with, and the fancy words 
used to describe them imply a scientification of the problems. All have proven 
their use, in so far as all have been put into scientific theories and mathematical 
models that explain the data they aim to describe.
If time is relative because it is a measurement of movement of matter through 
space, and if how matter “moves” is variable, then it is more relative to repe-
tition of initial conditions and thus more uncertain. Most of all, these theories 
are awaiting an epistemic framework that enables us to deal with the multiple 
dimensions of the evolutionary biorealities they have opened, not in the least by 
an evolutionary reconceptualization of our notion of time. Never has a generation 
of natural history scholars been studying actual historical material phenomena in 
time and space without a solid concept of either. Time is a hallmark of evolution-
ary science. Without time, there would be no origin or evolution of life, where 
through time living organisms change. Nonetheless, as natural and real as time 
appears to us, much of how we conceptualize time is the result of sociocultural 
constructs.
For the ancient Greeks and the Vedic Indians, time was cyclical and repetitive. 
Earth, fire, water, wind, and void/aether, the periodic table avant la lettre, made 
up the micro-, meso-, and macrocosmos, which were considered embedded struc-
tures. Much like Russian dolls, they made up inanimate, animate, and divine mat-
ter (a fire hearth, language, and the God Prometheus, for example). These beings 
underwent generation and decay, but eventually, time was cyclical, because with-
out a second law of thermodynamics, the elements themselves did not undergo 
decay, but rather they kept their integrity which is why the world could cyclically 
start over and reincarnate. For the Vedic Indian as well as ancient Greek philoso-
phers, time is not real. Aristotle, for example, defined time in terms of the motion 
of matter, and this concept was also foundational for Newton and the whole of 
Western science. Although time is absolute, because space and matter are, time 
itself is a derivative of matter in motion, which is why we use different "calen-
dars" and time scales, such as geological time, sidereal or tropical zodiac time, or 
heat. Our switch from a geocentric to a heliocentric worldview did not affect our 
watches in any way. Nonetheless, if we or any other living species travel a couple 
of thousand miles, we most certainly experience a change in time, and biological 
individuals have evolved circadian rhythms that enable them to deal with them. 
Time, whatever it is, is most certainly real for the living.
Equally, an organismal body is made up of different moving elements, which 
each follows their own pace. The cells of our body form complex and differen-
tiated structures such as bones, vascular systems, organs, neurons, and a brain. 
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These structures as well as the cells and the genes they are composed of differ in 
how they occupy space and time. Your skin cells rejuvenate at a monthly basis. 
The cells undergo mitosis, and the older ones die. Every 6 weeks, your lung cells 
do the same. Your organelles and the genetic material they contain replicate and 
regenerate at different time intervals than the cell’s nucleus. All have a different 
life span, a different beginning, and ending in time. In so far as the structures that 
compose you have come into existence before, in previously existing generations, 
they are more constant in time than you. The compositional structure that is “you” 
only exists once in so far as your specific compositions never come into exist-
ence twice. You have a clear beginning, life span, and ending in time. But it takes 
numerous generations of living cells to repeat the structures that form your exist-
ence over a longer period in time. Equally, it takes a couple of days before all cells 
that make up your body die, and the microbial communities that inhabit you live 
on for quite some time.
Current research is evolutionizing all. We are evolving toward a recognition of 
the existence of multiple units, levels, mechanisms, and kinds of evolution, and 
it is the challenge of our and future generations to investigate how they together 
make up the multilinear and multidimensional biological realities that have 
evolved (Gontier 2010a).
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